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I. INTRODUCTION

Even before the financial crisis of September 2008, the average
American worker would confidently report we live in troubled times.
Staggering income inequality has become the norm in the United States.'
Medical care has become an unaffordable luxury for working Americans
who lack employer-provided health insurance. New forms of work
organization and employment have rendered once secure jobs vulnerable
and, in some cases, removed those who labor from the protective ambit
of labor and employment law. A weakened labor movement is
increasingly at pains to protect those employees with union
representation from the fluctuations of global markets. Of course, most
American workers have no representation at all.
Such conditions obviously take a toll on workers' wallets. They also
potentially affect employee safety and health. There is evidence, for
example, that the flexibility demanded by employers in our new
economy acts as a persistent stressor with both physical and mental
health ramifications.2 Although studies of the problem are formative,
public health researchers, both in the United States and abroad, express
concern over the occupational safety and health (OSH) risks associated
with chronic job insecurity. 3 These researchers recommend developing a
research agenda to capture the extent of the problem and identify positive

f Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.S., Cornell University;
J.D., University of California at Berkeley; L.L.M., Columbia University; J.S.D.,
Columbia University. The author may be contacted at: susanb@tjsl.edu. I am indebted to
Professors Isabel Medina, Malcolm Sargeant, Paul Secunda, and Mike Zimmer, and Dr.
John Howard, who reviewed the manuscript before publication. The Article was also
improved by the commentary of faculty members of Loyola University, New Orleans,
School of Law, who invited me to participate in their annual Faculty Colloquium Series
in April 2009 and participants at a special symposium on occupational safety and health
held at the International Industrial Relations Association World Congress in Sydney,
Australia inAugust 2009.
1. See Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? CorporateSelfRegulationandthe Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 672 (2008).
2. See infra Part IV.C.3.

3. See J. Benach & C. Muntaner, PrecariousEmployment and Health: Developing a
Research Agenda, 61 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY COMM. HEALTH 276, 276-77 (2007).
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interventions to ameliorate it.4 Especially of concern are the workplace
safety and health issues affecting those in precarious or contingent
employment relationships, such as those considered temporary
employees, part-time workers, independent
contractors, and those who
5
labor outside the formal economy.
Assessing the problem, however, also requires focusing on the
regulatory challenges inherent in addressing it. Somewhat against the
grain, or at least conventional wisdom, this Article will argue that there is
much to be learned by evaluating the federal government's actions under
the Bush administration as it attempted to grapple with emerging OSH
issues and those which have plagued workers for years. That the Bush
administration accomplished anything related to OSH will come as a
surprise to some. Indeed, during George W. Bush's presidency, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the agency
responsible for OSH standard setting and enforcement, was a poor model
of regulatory practice.6 Harshly criticized by labor unions,7 advocates for
vulnerable workers,8 and Democratic members of Congress, 9 the agency
moved at a snail's pace when it came to rulemaking, 0 emphasized
employer self-regulation through voluntary compliance rather than
enforcement of existing standards," and stood accused of routinely
2
reducing the already low penalties assessed for employer violations.
Nonetheless, the federal government during the last administration
was notably active in identifying new occupational hazards, producing
reports and recommendations on the OSH challenges posed by worker
vulnerability, and promoting safe and healthy workplaces through actual
workplace interventions. 13 In fact, an entirely separate agency, the
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT (17th ed., Apr.
2008), available at http://wwww.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/doj 2008.pdf
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DEATH ON THE JOB 2008]. The AFL-CIO issues
an annual report using this title. Report content changes from year-to-year although the
title does not.
8. See, e.g., JUDITH BROWNE-DAVIS, ET AL., AND INJUSTICE FOR ALL: WORKERS'
LIVES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NEW ORLEANS 20 (2006); Am. Pub. Health Ass'n,
Hispanic Immigrant Safety Advocates Denounce Bogus OSHA "Summit," (July 22,
2004), available at http://www.apha.org/membergroups/newsletters/sectionnewsletters/occupat/fall04/1260.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
9. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which
bears the responsibility for conducting research and developing
recommendations to prevent occupational injury and illness, won good
marks during the Bush presidency from trade unions, employee
advocates, health and safety professionals, and industry. 14 Located within
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), NIOSH, during the Bush years,
refined and elaborated its research mission, and in so doing increased
stakeholder involvement, enhanced agency transparency and
accountability, and incentivized the translation of its research into safety
and health outcomes in the workplace. 15 NIOSH's efforts in this respect
stand in sharp contrast to the expressly ideological, deregulatory agenda
of the Bush Department of Labor (DOL), where OSHA is housed. 16
With a new administration in the White House, an administration17
committed to changing course on the enforcement of workplace law, 8
one might be tempted to look only to the future by passing new law,'
reinvigorating regulatory structures that languished over eight years, and
deploying new regulatory techniques. While those steps are certainly
necessary, neglecting the past would be regrettable. By looking back and
examining how workplace regulation fared and agencies functioned
during a period when deregulation flourished, one may identify
sustainable practices worth preserving and strengthening.
Mindful of this precept, this Article reviews the performance of
OSHA and NIOSH during the Bush administration to shed light on the
OSH challenges facing employees in the new economy and highlight
better ways of protecting workplace safety and health. To that end, the
academic debates surrounding new governance scholarship provide a
useful backdrop. New governance theory, broadly defined, criticizes
traditional, top-down, command and control legal regulation as ossified
and, to some extent, outdated.' 9 Alternatively, although not exclusively,
new governance theorists recommend regulatory techniques that are
14. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.

15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
17. See Labor Secretary Solis Pledges to Put Enforcement Back at DOL, WORKPLACE
L. REP., Mar. 6, 2009.
18. For example, on January 29, 2009, President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, legislation that overturns U.S. Supreme Court precedent that
greatly impaired the pursuit of pay equity cases. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Lilly
Ledbetter FairPay Act of 2009: President Obama's First Signed Bill Restores Essential
Protection Against Pay Discrimination, Feb.
13, 2009, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090213.htmi (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
19. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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more cooperative, reflexive, and participatory.20 Critics of new
governance, in contrast, wisely caution that the results of these new
techniques are mixed and that they may promote cosmetic rather than
actual compliance.2 1
Situating the safety agencies' recent records within those debates
reveals the pitfalls of traditional and new approaches to regulation and
the synergies between them. To improve the safety and health of
America's increasingly vulnerable workers, both approaches are required
but must be linked. Yet, the necessary links between them may be more
diffuse than many scholars assume. In other words, it is not necessary or
advisable for all programs that are cooperative, reflexive, and
participatory to be housed in traditional regulatory agencies. During
periods when deregulation is in vogue, agencies that lack enforcement
powers may be better positioned
to obtain substantive results than are
22
their regulatory counterparts.
Part II of this Article begins with an overview of OSH law and its
administration, including the respective roles of and relationship between
OSHA and NIOSH. OSHA is a regulatory agency, primarily responsible
for promulgating rules and standards, conducting workplace inspections,
and assessing fines for employer noncompliance. The agency has long
23
been associated with regulatory inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
NIOSH, in turn, is a scientific institute, and OSHA's soft law research
counterpart. The Institute has often functioned in the shadow of OSHA,
and the relationship between the two has historically been problematic;
coordination and collaboration have been relatively rare despite efforts to
foster communication through interagency agreement 24 and an issues
exchange group.25 Moreover, both agencies have been battered by
political winds. NIOSH, however, emerged from a threat to its existence
in the mid-1990s determined to partner with stakeholders, and increase
the real world significance and impact of its research.
Following this, Part III adds a theoretical component, focusing on
recent debates surrounding the work of new governance scholars. Their
critique of command and control regulation is a powerful one that
provides insight into the difficulties experienced by OSHA since its
inception, and also during George W. Bush's administration.
Additionally, descriptions of promising new governance techniques, as
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.
See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
See infra note 337.
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practiced by OSHA under the Clinton administration, set the stage for
understanding the subsequent failure of the Bush administration's
cooperative safety and health programming.
Part III also addresses how new governance insights apply to
NIOSH. More specifically, Professor Susan Sturm's case study of the
National Science Foundation's (NSF) ADVANCE program, which
provides grants to universities seeking to diversify their engineering and
science faculties, reveals how public agencies lacking traditional
regulatory enforcement power may nonetheless positively influence real
world outcomes. 26 Two mechanisms available are especially applicable
to NIOSH: collaborative problem solving involving agency stakeholders
and creative use of agency grant making authority. Like NSF, NIOSH
engages in collaborative problem solving with engaged stakeholders, a
process it began during the Clinton administration, and exercises
influence through its grant making activities. Sturm's study thus provides
a framework for evaluating NIOSH's efforts to translate OSH research
into real OSH gains for workers.2 7
Part IV reviews the records of OSHA and NIOSH during the Bush
administration. OSHA was a model of industry capture during those
years. 28 The agency withdrew numerous proposed regulations, delayed
others, modified warnings based on industry pressure, and emasculated
its cooperative programming. 29 NIOSH, in contrast, was able to continue
and improve vitally important strategic management reforms begun
under the Clinton administration, and in the process, bolstered its
credibility with its stakeholders, including trade unions, industry, and
OSH professionals. Ultimately, these enhanced relationships helped
insulate NIOSH from an apparently ideologically-driven, unsuccessful
effort in 2004 to demote the Institute within the CDC organizational
hierarchy.3 °
An assessment of the agencies' records reveals that in a deregulatory
environment, NIOSH was far more effective than OSHA at interpreting
its mission, and in pursuing, through creative program management,
actual OSH improvements for American workers. New governance
scholarship and this study of the OSH sister agencies suggests why this is
so; command and control regulatory systems are sensitive to regime
26. See generally Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of
Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, 323-60 (Grainne de

Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
27. Id. at 359.
28. See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
29. Id.; see also Part 1V.B.
30. See Part IV.C.2.
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change. Thus, the ideological orientation of a particular presidential
administration and of Congress seems to have a greater impact on
traditional regulatory agencies compared with agencies lacking
enforcement powers.
The Article concludes with Part V, which discusses the lessons to be
gleaned from the disparate records of OSHA and NIOSH during the last
presidential administration. Most important among these is that during
times of deregulation, agencies without regulatory powers may be best
positioned to carry on and even to reinterpret their missions to promote
positive change. 3 1 Moreover, the further they are removed from the
political fray, the better such non-regulatory agencies will function.
Thus, the executive department separation of these two OSH agencies,
often seen by scholars as inhibiting safety and health outcomes, may
represent an ideal configuration in periods when the very idea of state
regulation is under siege. Responding to the sentiments of President
Bush and the Republican-dominated Congress, OSHA greatly curtailed
its efforts to promulgate traditional OSH standards and rendered the new
governance regulatory efforts pursued during the Clinton era as largely
cosmetic. The separation of the two OSH agencies, however, protected
NIOSH from ideological infection by OSHA, creating space for the
former to expand, redefine, and improve the pursuit its OSH-related
mission. Had NIOSH been housed within the DOL, this effort would
have been much more difficult to sustain.
The challenge moving forward, now that deregulation has fallen
from grace and regulation is back in fashion, is to create meaningful yet
impermanent links between OSHA and NIOSH. Such links would
facilitate translation of NIOSH's research findings into actual hard law
regulation by OSHA. The two agencies might also partner on
cooperative initiatives aimed at employers. Inter-agency collaboration,
however, must not compromise NIOSH's independence. In this sense,
NIOSH independence is akin to a vaccination increasing the odds that
NIOSH will remain in good health during future periods when
deregulation is again ascendant.
II. OSH LAW AND ITS FRACTURED ADMINISTRATION

Although American OSH legislation dates back to the late nineteenth
century, the modern era of OSH regulation began in 1970 with the
passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).32 The
3 1. See infra Part Ill.B.

32. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78

(2000).
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product of trade union political agitation, public concern over a
succession of mining and construction industry fatalities, and Congress's
determination that national minimum OSH standards were warranted, the
OSH Act aims "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. 33
Considered to be landmark legislation at its passage, the Act grants
authority to the Secretary of Labor to promulgate OSH standards, require
compliance with those standards, and, to that end, conduct workplace
inspections, issue citations and penalties, and prescribe hazard
abatement. 34 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
created shortly after the Act's passage, is the federal agency in the DOL
responsible for these activities. 35 No private right of action exists under
the OSH Act, which leaves enforcement levels dependent upon the
budget granted to the agency through the political process.36
When Congress passed the OSH Act, it created an unconventional
regulatory structure in two ways. First, Congress decided to locate the
scientists responsible for advising OSHA in a different executive
department. As noted above, NIOSH is part of the DHHS. The Director
of NIOSH reports directly to the Director of the Centers for Disease
Control, who in turn reports to the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services.37 Executive department separation apparently
33. Id. § 65 1(b).
34. Id.§ 651 (b)(3).
35. While OSHA has primary authority for U.S. OSH policy and enforcement, it is
not the only entity that regulates in the area. By statute, OSHA is prevented from
regulating working conditions where any other federal agency occupies the field. Id. §
653(b)(1). Thus, health and safety regulation in the mining industry is administered by a
separate federal agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), which is
responsible for enforcement of the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended by
the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006. 30 U.S.C. § 801
(1977). For details about the MSHA, see http://www.msha.gov/. Similarly, OSHA's
authority to regulate farmworker pesticide exposure is restricted due to the
Environmental Protection Agency's jurisdiction over pesticide hazard warnings. See
Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing Health and Safety: Workplace
Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 373, 377
(2000). Courts have also deemed OSHA preempted from regulating in segments of the
airline and railroad industries because of the regulatory activities of other federal
agencies. Id. Furthermore, the OSH Act sets up a separate scheme of OSH regulation for
federal employees. 29 U.S.C. § 668 (2009).
36. 1 am indebted to Professor Mike Zimmer for raising this point.
37. From its establishment in 1970 until 1980, the Director of NIOSH reported
directly to the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, which became DHHS in 1979.
Thereafter "[tihe Reagan administration administratively assigned NIOSH to [the] CDC."
Letter from Dr. John Howard to Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, Aug. 22, 2009 (on file
with author). See also Posting of Jordan Barab, NIOSH Reorganization: Good, Bad or
Ugly?, to Confined Space: News and Commentary on Workplace Health & Safety, Labor
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seemed natural because NIOSH's predecessor, the Bureau of
Occupational Health and Safety, was located within the Department of
Health Education and Welfare (HEW), the precursor to DHHS.38
Safeguarding the interests of the existing bureaucracies, in public health
on the one hand and in the DOL on the other, is one way of explaining
this split structure.39
Second, Congress created, outside of any executive department, an
independent federal agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC), as the body which adjudicates disputes over
OSH citations. 40 In other words, while OSHA is empowered to
promulgate the standards, inspect workplaces, and issue citations where
it believes violations have occurred, employers may contest those
citations before OSHRC, which acts as an administrative court. 41 This
procedure, at variance from most regulatory agencies, which have their
own internal adjudicative structures, was a necessary political
compromise to assuage employers' concerns over potentially biased
adjudication. Employers argued that if OSHA were given responsibility
for rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication, adjudicative impartiality
would be compromised.42 While criticisms of this split enforcement
model are beyond the scope of this article, 4 3 criticisms of the separation
of OSHA and NIOSH are important to consider.
Commentators considering the relationship between OSHA and
NIOSH have noted the problems inherent in locating the agencies in
different executive departments. For example, Professors Shapiro and
McGarity have noted:
NIOSH and OSHA have significant coordination problems.
First, OSHA does not have a sufficient number of health
professionals to review NIOSH research in-depth. As a result,
OSHA employees find that "OSHA-NIOSH relations are 'close
and Politics, http://spewingforth.blogspot.com/2004_05 01_spewingfortharchive.html
(May 24, 2004, 21:16 EST) (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) ("Although the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 originally envisioned NIOSH as an independent institute
like one of the National Institutes of Health, it was put under the Centers for Disease
Control umbrella where it has struggled for its independence.").
38. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J.ON REG. 1, 57-58 (1989).
39. See Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate: Silica
and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 322-23 (2006).
40. See U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, available at
http://www.oshrc.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
41. Id.
42. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 38, at 59 n. 333.
43. See id. at 59-62.
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to non-existent at the working level."' Second, no single
administrator is in a position to resolve disputes between the two
organizations. The Secretary of Labor has no authority over
NIOSH and the Secretary of HHS has no authority over OSHA.
Coordination, therefore, requires either agreement between the
two agencies or the intervention of both Secretaries. Since
NIOSH and OSHA rarely elevate disputes to that level, the two
agencies coexist in an uneasy, and sometimes unproductive,
relationship. 44
An earlier but similar critique by Professor Mark Rothstein attributed
the difficulties in forging inter-agency collaboration to a shortage of
professional expertise at OSHA. 45 He noted that NIOSH generates much
more scientific information than OSHA can consume.4 6 Moreover, the
priorities and policies of the sister agencies are often out of sync.47
Professors Marc Eisner, Jeff Worsham, and Evan Ringquist tie the
agencies' coordination problems to the difficulty of integrating the work
produced by professionals from different disciplines. 48 OSHA is an
agency made up primarily of safety engineers and industrial hygienists;
scientists predominate at NIOSH. 49 The professional norms of these
groups vary widely by discipline. Thus, for example, a scientific study
takes years to complete, and this may put NIOSH
scientists' agenda into
50
staff.
OSHA
of
incentives
the
with
conflict
Professor Ted Greenwood has noted of NIOSH that "[r]esearch
whose budget and priorities are set independently of the agenda and the
needs of its client regulatory program can tend toward unresponsiveness
51
and even irrelevance from the perspective of the [OSHA] regulators."
44. Id. at 58. See also Cynthia Washam, Working Toward a New NIOSH, 104 ENVTL.
5, 484-86 (1996), availableat http://www.ehponline.org/docs/1996/1045/soi.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) (quoting Gary Visscher a staff professional on the
House Workforce Protections Subcommittee: "The lack of coordination between OSHA
and NIOSH has been a recurring problem.").
45. See Mark A. Rothstein, Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA
Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards as an Example, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627,
652-53 (1985).
46. Id. at 653.
47. Id. at 653-54. See also FRANK J. THOMPSON, HEALTH POLICY AND THE
BUREAUCRACY: POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION 235 (1983) (noting "[a]t times... OSHA
and NIOSH administrators failed to see eye-to-eye..." on the agenda for inquiry).
48. MARC ALLEN EISNER, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 195 (2006).
49. Id.
50. Id.
HEALTH PERSP.

51. TED GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION

123 (1985).
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Greenwood also maintained, however, that organizational separation
likely "enhanced the quality of the research product and resulted in a
better reputation for objectivity [for NIOSH] than would otherwise have
been possible. 5 2
A 1979 Memorandum of Agreement entered into by OSHA and
NIOSH sets forth a framework for their regulatory relationship. 53 The
agreement describes the responsibilities of each agency and provides
mechanisms for communication. By all accounts, however, the close
coordination envisioned by the agreement has never taken place. 54 In
theory, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a cabinet level
office within the Executive Office of the President, might play a
coordinating role for the two OSH agencies. In recent years OMB's
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has added
scientific expertise to its civil service staff to assist it in inter-agency
55
information coordination and the development of regulatory policy.
However, OMB does not appear to have played that role. A recent search
of the OMB website using the search terms "National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health" and "NIOSH" turned up just one
document, an item not relevant to OSHA-NIOSH relations.56
Some see the failure of the Memorandum of Agreement to create a
strong inter-agency relationship, and the departmental separation of
OSHA and NIOSH more generally, as having hampered "OSHA's ability
to set standards. 5 7 This Article, however, will argue that the lack of
coordination between the agencies actually protected NIOSH during a
period of strong deregulatory sentiment, enabling the creation of
important scientific knowledge, and the development of program
management techniques designed to get that research into the hands of
stakeholders who can use it. Before fleshing out that argument, however,
the Article will set forth the respective roles and responsibilities of
OSHA and NIOSH.

52. Id. at 124.
53.

RANDY S. RABINOWITZ, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

&

HEALTH,

795-96 (2d ed. 2004);

OSHA-NIOSH Interagency Agreement on Employee Protection, Apr. 17, 1979, OSH
Rep. [Reference File] 21:7001.
54. See Rothstein, supra note 45, at 654.
55. EPA 's RestructuredIRIS System: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Investigations
and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 1-2 (May 21,
2008) (statement of Susan E. Dudley, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget).
56. See Office of Management and Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
57. Morriss & Dudley, supra note 39, at 323.
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A. OSHA's Regulatory Responsibilitiesand its Position as the Agency
People Love to Hate
OSHA is a traditional, top-down regulator. OSHA's responsibilities
include administering two kinds of safety and health mandates: employer
obligations falling within the OSH Act's general duty clause and specific
standards promulgated by the agency.58 Under the OSH Act's general
duty clause, employers must ensure "employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm., 59 Employers may be
liable for breaching their general duty where
OSHA has not issued a
60
standard related to the hazard in question.
Additionally, employers must comply with specific OSH standards
properly promulgated by OSHA, which fall into three categories: interim
standards adopted shortly after OSHA's inception, permanent standards
promulgated via agency rulemaking, and temporary or emergency
standards adopted without rulemaking, but only after the agency finds a
"particular substance or new hazard poses a grave danger .. .and an
emergency measure is necessary to protect employees from such
61
danger.",
From the agency's inception, OSHA's attempts to promulgate
standards have been harshly criticized and often judicially challenged.
Employers subject to OSHA's initial efforts at standard-setting decried
the rules as overly complex, burdensome, and, in some cases, unlikely to
yield real gains in safety.62 To some extent, this criticism has continued
unabated; business groups often howl that OSHA standards, which in
some cases increase the cost of doing business, are "inefficient,

58. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS

LIMITATIONS 826 (2007).

59.
60.
61.
62.

29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2009).
See United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 1999).
GLYNN, ET AL., supra note 58, at 827.
See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The

Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1087 (2005). Indeed,
OSHA's adoption of thousands of interim standards shortly after passage of the OSH Act
produced a "storm of controversy" where business interests were angered by the
complex, numerous, and highly specific new requirements being imposed on employers
and their concern was fueled by the sometimes tenuous connection between these
standards and worker safety and health. GLYNN, ET AL., supra note 58, at 827; see also
EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 184 ("Nixon's assistant secretary of labor, George
Guenther, adopted some 4,400 standards wholesale after one month, many of which were
widely acknowledged as irrelevant or trivial.").
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overbearing, and unnecessary. 63 Organized labor and its supporters, in
contrast, have long been frustrated by the length of time required to
promulgate safety and health standards. 64 The creation of OSH standards
is a lengthy process requiring extensive opportunity for public and
stakeholder input.65 Indeed, it is not unusual for the standard-setting
process to take a total of eight years or more.
Worksite inspections are also part of OSHA's mandate. Employers
are expected to consent to OSHA inspections that are reasonable in time,
manner, and scope. 66 So-called un-programmed inspections are
conducted when hazardous working conditions are identified by
employee complaints, the occurrence of fatalities or catastrophes, or
referral by another agency. 67 Programmed inspections are directed at
employers evidencing hazardous workplaces through, for example, high
rates of employee injury or illness.68
Like standard-setting, OSHA inspections have long been a subject of
criticism. While employers may experience a compliance inspection as
an unwarranted, adversarial regulatory encounter,69 many observers
consider OSHA to be understaffed and under-funded. Given the breadth
of the U.S. workforce, the size of OSHA's staff and its Congressional
appropriation are modest at best and more appropriately described as
shockingly thin. As of 2008, OSHA reported that there were over 115
63. GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND
INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 59 (2007).
Decades after OSHA's adoption of thousands of interim standards, business interests
continue to complain about them. Surprisingly, interim standards, many of which were
simply "consensus" standards adopted by professional standard setting organizations with
business interests in mind, still comprise the bulk of OSHA's standards corpus. GLYNN,
ET AL., supra note 58, at 827. Ironically, business interests reflexively oppose new OSH
regulations as a matter of course, whether those regulations would produce actual safety
gains or not.
64. See Lynn Rhinehart, Workers at Risk: The Unfulfilled Promise of the
OccupationalSafety andHealth Act, I I W. VA. L. REV. 117, 130 (2008) (noting that the
OSHA "rulemaking process is slow and cumbersome").
65. James T. O'Reilly, Worker "Right to Know" in 30-Year Retrospect: Did We Get
It Right, With What We Know Today?, 2 PITT. J. ENVTL PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 14 (2008)
("Creation of occupational safety standards must follow a lengthy prescribed process
with extensive public input.").
66. Horace A. Thompson, III, Occupational Safety and Health, in 2 INT'L LAB. &
EMP. LAWS 23h-1, 23h-13 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds. 2nd 2003).
67. Id at 23h-12.
68. Id. at 23h-13.
69. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 104-16 (1982); see also Lobel, supra

note 62, at 1089-90 (detailing the counterproductive effects of adversarial OSH
enforcement).
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million employees in the private sector located at eight million
worksites. 70 Yet in fiscal year 2008, OSHA employed just 2186
employees, 7' approximately half of whom work as compliance
inspectors.72 OSHA's appropriation for fiscal year 2008 was $490.3
million. 73 AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel Lynn Rhinehart recently
noted that given its current level of resources, OSHA can conduct
inspections of "each
workplace under its jurisdiction on average once
74
every 133 years."
A final major area of OSHA responsibility is worth considering: the
issuance of citations and penalties to noncompliant employers. Both the
OSH Act and OSHA have been subject to significant criticism for failing
to provide sufficient sanctions to deter wrongdoing. 75 The Act contains a
civil penalty structure that allows OSHA to assess "a maximum $70,000
penalty for a willful or repeated violation," a penalty ceiling that has not
increased since 1990.76 The inadequacy of the OSH Act's penalty
70. OSHA Facts - August 2008, available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/oshafacts.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). Although the OSH Act does not cover state and
local governments in their roles as employers, it does encourage states to establish and
maintain their own OSH plans, which are then monitored by OSHA. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5)
(2009). There are presently twenty-four states and two US territories that operate OSHAapproved safety and health programs.
71. OSHA Facts - August 2008, supra note 70.
72. Lobel, supra note 62, at 1081.
73. OSHA Facts - August 2008, supra note 70. President Obama's Secretary of
Labor, Hilda Solis, has requested an OSHA appropriation of $563.6 million for OSHA
for fiscal year 2010. See Gayle Cinquegrani, Labor Department: DOL FY 2010 Budget
Calls for More OSHA and Wage Hour Inspectors, Solis Tells House, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), A13 (May 13, 2009). The funding increase would be used in part to hire 213
additional full-time OSHA employees. Id. A priority for OSHA will be increasing the
number of bilingual inspectors. Id. Secretary Solis anticipates that the additional funding
will make possible the hiring of 130 new inspectors. See Stephen Lee, Safety & Health:
More OSHA Inspectors May Not Be Enough, Solis Says as OSHA Chief Nomination
Nears, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), A4 (July 2, 2009).
74. Rhinehart, supra note 64, at 122. As Rhinehart points out, if one includes
inspectors from OSHA's state partner agencies, the number of inspectors rises to about
2000 or "one inspector for every 63,000 workers." Id. The International Labor
Organization, the specialized agency of the United Nations that sets international labor
standards, recommends industrialized democracies employ "1 inspector for every 10,000
covered workers." Id. Of course, given limited resources, OSHA targets its inspections to
prioritize high hazard industries. HUBER, supra note 63, at 112-15. Even with targeting,
however, OSHA regions exhibit considerable "variation in enforcement efforts." Id.at
113.
75. The OSH Act does not provide compensation for injured workers. In the United
States, injured workers receive compensation for their injuries and disabilities through
state-administered, no-fault workers compensation systems. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(4).
76. See Discounting Death: OSHA 's Failure to Punish Safety Violations That Kill
Workers, Majority Staff Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 8 (April 29,
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structure is highlighted by penalties available under other statutory
schemes. For example, the Department of Commerce may impose a
$325,000 fine for violation of the South Pacific Tuna Act, 7 7 and the
Environmental Protection Agency may impose a $270,000 penalty for
Clean Air Act violations.78
Moreover, even the OSH Act's criminal penalties, which may be
imposed where a willful violation causes a worker's death, pale in
comparison to those of other statutes. Violating a safety law that leads to
a worker's death constitutes "a class B misdemeanor, punishable by not
more than six months in jail and/or fines of no more than $250,000 for an
individual or $500,000 for an organization." 79 In comparison
"improperly hunting migratory birds or importing exotic wild birds" can
result in a maximum prison term of two years. 80
OSHA has failed to make vigorous use of this weak penalty
structure. A recent government review found OSHA supervisors
routinely reduce by about forty percent the penalties initially assessed in
worker fatality cases. 8' In fiscal year 2007, the median final penalty for
cases involving fatalities was $29,400, less than fifty percent of the
maximum civil penalty. 82 Additionally, between 2003 and 2007, only
21.1 percent of eligible fatality cases were referred to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution; the DOJ pursued only 4.2 percent
of the referrals. 83 Stated in numerical terms, of OSHA's 9838 fatality
inspections in the years 2003-2008, 237 cases were eligible for referral
to the DOJ for criminal prosecution, yet
OSHA only referred fifty cases
84
and the DOJ pursued ten of those cases.
Penalties for serious non-fatal violations are shockingly low. In fiscal
year 2007, the average penalty for a serious violation, defined as a
violation posing "a substantial probability of death or serious physical
harm," was only $909.85 The tendency to avoid imposing stiff penalties is
apparently a long-standing part of OSHA's regulatory culture.86
2008), available at http://www.philaposh.org/pdf/2008kennedyreport.pdf (last visited
Jan, 22, 2010) [hereinafter DiscountingDeath].
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.at 6. The maximum penalties are doubled where the employer has a previous

willful violation.
80. Id.
81. Id.at 5.
82. DiscountingDeath, supra note 76, at 6.

83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 20.
85. DEATH ON THE JOB 2008, supra note 7, at 8.

86. A 1992 General Accounting Office study found, for example, that OSHA only
cited the maximum penalty for 2.1 percent of its penalty violation caseload and then
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Commentators have described the hesitancy of the agency to
aggressively enforce the law as a culture of reluctance.87
As a top-down, traditional regulatory agency, OSHA measures its
effectiveness through occupational fatality, illness, and injury rates. Less
than a week before stepping down as President Bush's long-serving
Secretary of Labor, Elaine Chao touted as evidence of effective
regulation a fourteen percent decrease in the occupational fatality rate
between the years 2001 to 2007, and a twenty-one percent drop in the
occupational illness and injury rate between 2002 and 2007.88 Yet critics
cast doubt on the accuracy of the injury and illness statistics, estimating
that perhaps sixty-nine percent of workplace injuries and illnesses remain
unreported. 89 These critics blame OSHA's recordkeeping and reporting
systems, which rely on employer self-reporting of worker illness and
injury. 90 In fact, one recent academic analysis attributes reported injury
and illness declines not to OSHA effectiveness, but to changes in OSHA
recordkeeping requirements. 91
Moreover, even if fatality rates are actually declining, a lack of
fatality data on contract workers, whose numbers have been growing
over time, may cause misimpressions of the fatality rate of a particular
employer or an industry.92 Presently, 63.4 percent of American
construction workers work as contractors rather than being considered
regular employees.93 Use of contract workers is also growing in the
health care industry, for janitorial services, and in oil refineries. 94 These
workers are frequently brought in to do the most dangerous jobs, may
lack qualifications for assigned tasks, and often are not provided with
safety training. 95 Yet when a contract worker is injured or killed on the
job, that individual will not be recorded on the worksite employer's
"actually imposed the maximum" penalty on less than one percent of the caseload. See
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS ARE WELL BELOW MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PENALTIES 6 (April 1992).

87. Lobel, supra note 62, at 1085-86.
88. Gayle Cinquegrani, Chao, Leaving DOL After Eight Years, Cites Safety Gains
Overhaulof FLSA Regulations, 10 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) AA1 (Jan. 16, 2009).
89. See HIDDEN TRAGEDY: UNDERREPORTING OF WORKPLACE INJURY AND ILLNESSES,
MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB. 2 (June 2008).
90. Id.
91. Lee S. Friedman & Linda Forst, The Impact of OSHA Recordkeeping Regulation
Changes on OccupationalInjury and Illness Trends in the US: A Time-Series Analysis,
64 OCCUPATIONAL. ENVTL. MED. 454 (2007).
92. See Stephen Lee, Labor Department to Begin Tracking Fatalities of Contract
Workers in 2011, 33 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A4, (Feb. 23, 2009).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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OSHA log or industry classification; rather, the incident is recorded
against the contractor employing the worker. 96 Thus, the worksite
employer's safety record is not affected by the incident and, where its
industry differs from that of the contractor, the worksite employer's
industry may appear much safer than it is in reality.
In 2011, in response to this problem, the Obama administration's
Bureau of Labor Statistics will begin collecting statistics on contractor
fatalities. 9 Such data is essential to address the needs of this vulnerable
and growing population. The failure to track fatalities of these workers
heretofore, however, and the criticisms of injury and illness
recordkeeping noted above, greatly undercut former Secretary Chao's
claims of OSHA's efficacy.
OSHA's overall record reveals an agency hampered in pursuing its
mission.98 Some of that difficulty is attributable to the inherent
constraints facing OSHA, including resource scarcity, the burdensome
legal process associated with promulgating safety and health standards,
and the politicized nature of regulating occupational safety and health. 99
OSHA's record under the Bush administration, howcvcr, is described by
critics as an abdication of regulatory responsibility.10 0 During that time,
the agency expended considerable energy on its cooperative compliance
programs, which aim to change the relationship between OSHA and
employer stakeholders from adversarial to innovative and responsive. 01'
The creation of these programs and their management during the Bush
administration will be discussed in Parts III and IV below. Before that,
however, a description of the role of NIOSH, OSHA's research partner,
is in order.
B. NIOSH's Functionsas OSHA 's Research Partnerand the Public's
Research Translatorfor PotentialOSH Improvements
The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, sometimes
described as OSHA's research partner, was created by the OSH Act in
1970. Unlike OSHA, however, NIOSH is not housed within the
Department of Labor. Rather, NIOSH is a division of the Centers for
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Orly Lobel has noted that the OSHA is often held up "as the prime example of
regulatory failure and bureaucratic pathologies." Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational
Safety in the United States, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 269,

270 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds. 2006).
99. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 38, at 4-14.
100. See infra note 194.
101. See infra Part Ill.
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Disease Control, 02
and as such, is within the Department of Health and
Human Services. 1
NIOSH pursues its mission through the use of epidemiological,
laboratory, and engineering research methodologies.10 3 Headquartered in
Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, with labs and offices in seven
states, NIOSH maintains a staff of about 1200, with training in
disciplines including, epidemiology, medicine, industrial hygiene, safety,
psychology, engineering, chemistry, physics, and statistics.' °4 The
NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors, made up of well regarded
scientists from various fields, guides NIOSH in developing and
evaluating its research so that it conforms to the highest scientific
06
standards. 105 NIOSH's funding for fiscal year 2008 was $274 million.
Commentator's discussing NIOSH's mission often confine
themselves to NIOSH's role in conducting research and making
recommendations for the development of safety and health standards in
order to prevent occupational injury, illness, disability, and death.10 7 In
short, under this view, NIOSH exists to perform the research from which
10 8
it makes recommendations to OSHA for regulatory standard setting.
OSHA then has the option to act on NIOSH's recommendations if it so
chooses. 09

102. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, About NIOSH, availableat
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
103. See Kenneth A. Kovach, et al., OSHA and the Politics of Reform: An Analysis of
OSHA Reform Initiatives Before the 104th Congress, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 169, 172
(1997).
104. See John Howard, Informing Public Health Policy and Practice: The Strategic
Management of Research Processes and Organizations, 22 GOVERNANCE 203, 206
(2009).
105. See NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors Charter, available at
http://origin.cdc.gov/niosh/BSC/BSCcharter.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). Another
advisory committee, the Mine Safety and Health Research Advisory Committee, plays a
similar role regarding research germane to the Mine Safety and Health Act. See Mine
Safety
and Health
Research
Advisory
Committee Charter, available at
http://cdc.gov/maso/FACM/facmMSHRAC.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).

106. See AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 60 (18th ed. Apr.
2009), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/doj_2009.cfn (last
visited Jan, 22, 2010) [hereinafter DEATH ON THE JOB 2009].
107. See Michael T. Heenan & C. Gregory Ruffennach, National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health: Limits of Authority in Rulemaking under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 7 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 171 (1992).

108. S. REP. No. 108-345, at 89 (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/?&sid=cpl 08B1GAR&refer=-&r n=sr345.108&db id=l 08&item=&sel=TO
C_278993& (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
109. Id. Since 1970, NIOSH's scientific support duties have grown beyond those
initially derived from OSH Act, and presently include carrying out research efforts under
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John Howard, NIOSH Director for six years during the Bush
administration, conceptualizes NIOSH's mission much more broadly:
NIOSH was established by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 [] as a scientific organization to generate new
knowledge in the field of worker safety and health through
research, to transfer that new knowledge into the everyday
practice of safety and health, and to educate professionals in the
field of safety and health. From the governmental perspective,
NIOSH was established to support the standards development
responsibilities of its sister agencies .... 110
This articulation of the mission, while acknowledging NIOSH's
traditional role in assisting OSHA, liberates the Institute from exclusive
ties to and reliance upon its sister agency. It also takes into account some
important programs at NIOSH, including the Health Hazard Evaluations
(HHEs) conducted by the Institute when employees, their
representatives, or employers contact the agency about a potentially
hazardous or harmful workplace condition."' Accordingly, under this
expansive definition, NIOSH plays dual roles with respect to the research
it conducts: (1) scientific translation, focused on transforming research
into real workplace improvements; and (2) scientific support for federal
regulatory standard setting. The latter relies on traditional regulatory
process in order to bring about change. The former clearly does not.
Establishing a role for the Institute apart from the lengthy, politicized
rule making process also produces three interesting byproducts. First, it
tends to insulate NIOSH from potential critics, who may argue that
expending taxpayer money for research, much of which is not utilized by
OSHA, is economically inefficient.' 12 That criticism is greatly blunted,
and NIOSH's public accountability enhanced, if the research has
applications outside of rulemaking.

the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and the Energy Employees Occupational Illness
and Compensation Act of 2000.
110. Howard, supra note 104, at 205-06.
111. See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Health Hazard
Evaluations, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/HHEprogram.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010). An HHE is a NIOSH study of an actual workplace to determine whether
the employees are exposed to hazardous substances or harmful conditions. Id.
112. In fact, such an argument helped fuel a 1995 effort by Congressman Thomas Cass
Ballenger (R-NC) to abolish NIOSH. See Kovach, et al., supra note 103, at 172.
NIOSH's critics at that time argued the Institute was inefficient, engaged in insufficient
standards development, and had an excessive budget. Id. at 181.
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Second, an expanded mission is conducive to creating new metrics
for measuring NIOSH's real world impact.1 13 Tracing NIOSH activity to
outcomes apart from OSHA's mandatory standards increases the ways of
assessing how effective the agency really is.
Finally, an expanded mission can function as a morale booster and
motivator for NIOSH staff.1 14 Those devoting their careers to public
health can only benefit from knowing there are many ways to improve
the safety and health of the public they serve.
Support for Dr. Howard's view of NIOSH's mission can be found in
the OSH Act. Thus, section 22,' 15 which created NIOSH, ties the
Institute to the general purposes set forth in section 2 of the Act, which
are greater than simply setting mandatory standards, and include
providing training programs, encouraging OSH-related joint labormanagement efforts, and more generally encouraging employers and
workers to institute new OSH-related programs and improve on existing
programs. 1 6 Section 22 also includes by reference sections 20 and 21,117
the first which lays out the research and related duties of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 1 8 including the publication and
dissemination of findings, and the second, which covers training and
employee education.1 19
1. MeasuringNIOSH's Effectiveness - Part 1
Like OSHA, NIOSH measures its effectiveness through occupational
fatality, illness, and injury rates. 120 Yet NIOSH does not claim exclusive
credit for overall declines in these rates when they occur. Rather, the
Institute acknowledges that improvements in worker safety and health
are brought about by the combined efforts of NIOSH and a host of
NIOSH partners, including its federal sister agencies, state and local
OSH agencies, employer and labor stakeholders, and academic

113. Measuring the agency's real world impact is especially important in an age of
limited public resources. See Howard, supra note 104, at 213.
114. In order to prevent adversely affecting morale, agency leadership should make
clear its commitment to managing for actual results rather than simply increasing
"management authority over science." Id.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (2009).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2009).
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669-70 (2009).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 669.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 670.
120. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, STRATEGIC
PLAN: 1997-2002, DHHS (NIOSH) Publ. No. 98-137, at 5-6, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/gpranla.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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researchers outside of NIOSH. 2 In this respect, the Institute's stance
stands in stark contrast
to the claims of President Bush's Secretary of
122
Labor, Elaine Chao.
Moreover, there are more discrete measures with which to assess
NIOSH's effectiveness, such as when NIOSH research is used by OSHA
to promulgate a mandatory standard. For example, NIOSH counts as a
significant accomplishment, the virtual elimination of byssinosis,
commonly known as brown lung disease, a condition causally linked to
inhaling cotton dust. 123 OSHA used NIOSH findings in promulgating its
cotton dust standard in 1978, and additional NIOSH research led to
subsequent revisions of the standard in 1985 and 2001.124 Those laboring
in the American textile industry, which admittedly has been hard hit by
globalization, can benefit from improved factory ventilation and
increased 26medical surveillance.1 25 NIOSH research contributed to that
outcome. 1
Another success is NIOSH's creation of a program to eliminate
diseases associated with coal mining, especially pneumoconiosis, known
popularly as black lung disease. 127 Based on ongoing surveillance of
miners, NIOSH's Respiratory Disease Research Program (RDRP), the
Coal Workers' Health Surveillance Program, has conducted hundreds of
thousands of x-ray examinations, and issued letters to 18,000 miners
informing them of their right to transfer to jobs exposing them to less
dust. 128 NIOSH estimates its RDRP has assisted in reducing the level of
black lung disease in long-tenure miners from approximately
thirty-five
29
percent in the 1970s to about five percent at present.1
In evaluating NIOSH's impact, however, one must look carefully at
and also beyond OSHA's regulatory standard setting activities, and for
that matter the activities of the other regulatory agencies NIOSH
supports. 130 This is not only because the standard setting process is so
lengthy, politically fraught, and cumbersome, but also because OSHA,
during various historical periods, has been unreceptive to promulgating
121. Id. at 6.
122. See Cinquegrani, supra note 88.
123. See Washam, supra note 44, at 484.
124. See NIOSH Program Portfolio: Respiratory Diseases, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/programs/resp/outcomes.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
125. See Washam, supra note 44, at 485.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See NIOSH Program Portfolio, supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. NIOSH, for example, collaborates with the Mine Safety and Health
Administration on issues involving miner health, such as pneumoconiosis.
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regulatory standards. Tracing NIOSH research into OSHA standard
setting is a difficult enterprise during such periods.
For example, among NIOSH's earliest efforts in the 1970s was the
Institute's production of reports on silicosis, which is caused by the
inhalation of finely ground sand.131 Indeed, NIOSH recommendations on
OSHA standard setting, including a proposed ban of silica sand in
abrasive blasting, were issued in 1974.132 Industry pressure delayed
OSHA adoption of NIOSH recommendations during the Carter
administration, and the dawn of the vigorously deregulatory era of
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush temporarily halted, for a period
of twelve years, efforts to convert 33NIOSH's recommendations on silica
into enforceable OSHA standards.1
Nonetheless, during the Clinton administration, the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA), a sister agency of NIOSH and OSHA,
used NIOSH data on silica to establish a rule on rock drilling dust,
though no OSHA standard was adopted. 34 Not surprisingly, the
promulgation of an OSHA rule was stalled during the eight years of the
last Bush administration.135 Even so, NIOSH has worked to promote
substitute materials for silica sand in abrasive blasting, has disseminated
information on improved engineering controls for silica dust, and
estimates its Respiratory Diseases Research Program (RDRP) has
assisted in reducing mortality from silicosis from greater than 1000
workers per year through 1970 to less than 200 per year since 1997.136
Thus, NIOSH's efforts have produced positive effects even in the
absence of regulatory action by OSHA.
Over the last twelve years, through strategic management, NIOSH
has become systematic about setting outcome goals for its research and
measuring those outcomes.137 This performance orientation to managing
a federal scientific institute is mentioned in Part III below and discussed
more thoroughly in Part IV. Before that, however, one must examine
NIOSH's encounters with the political establishment since it was a
critical political threat to NIOSH's very existence that gave
rise to the
38
Institute's strategic management program in the first place.

131. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Silicosis and the Ongoing Struggle to Protect
Workers'Health,in WORKER SAFETY UNDER SIEGE 61, 64 (Vernon Mogensen ed. 2006).
132. Id. at 65.
133. Id. at 65-66.
134. NIOSH Program Portfolio, supra note 124.
135. See infra note 229.
136. Id.
137. See generally Howard, supra note 104.
138. Id. at 206.
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2. NIOSH's Encounters With Politics - Part1
In contrast to OSHA, whose top administrator has tended to be a
Presidential appointee highly responsive to the political agenda of the
White House, 139 NIOSH has a reputation for apolitical, scientific rigor
and independence. 40 NIOSH's approach to its mission is not accidental;
rather it is part-and-parcel of the bifurcated regulatory structure Congress
created. As one commentator has noted:
It was no mistake that Congress used "National Institute" in
naming NIOSH, thus sending the message that directed research
was essential for improving worker health and safety. As the
research arm, NIOSH was to be kept away from overt political
influence. Congress very specifically placed NIOSH in the
DHEW (now DHHS), to keep it separate and independent from
the Department of Labor, providing a check and balance to the
highly political workplace enforcement environment. Further,
NIOSH's Director was to be appointed by the Secretary of
DHHS for terms of 6 years in order to insulate it from
presidential politics. 141
And unlike OSHA, which seems a perpetual target of criticism,
NIOSH's work over the past dozen years has been praised by
organizations as diverse as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
American Society of Safety Engineers, the American Industrial Hygiene
Association, and the American Federation of Labor - Congress of

139. See EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 199 ("At OSHA, the selection of the agency
executive can have a major impact on the agency's regulatory posture. The history of the
agency provides a number of examples of appointees who have furthered presidential

agendas."). This is not to say that OSHA's career civil servants operate in a blatantly
political manner. One study, in fact, demonstrates that OSHA's field bureaucracy
operates in an administratively neutral fashion. See generally Huber, supra note 63. In
other words, these civil servants act to implement the law neutrally, without regard to
political concerns. Id. The political responsiveness referred to above relates to OSHA's

top administrator's willingness or unwillingness to advance a traditional regulatory
agenda. If, for example, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health decides that the agency should put its appropriation dollars into voluntary
compliance rather than employer inspection activities, he or she can greatly affect the

way the agency functions notwithstanding the views or desires of career civil servants.
140. See Rick Weiss, Change at CDC Draws Protest, WASHINGTON

POST,

Aug. 31,

2004, at A 19.
141. Denny Dobbin, Where to Put

NIOSH?, MEDSCAPE

PUBLIC

HEALTH

AND

PREVENTION, May 31, 2005, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/504483

(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
which is one of two major
142
American trade union federations.
Yet NIOSH has not escaped politics entirely and, has struggled
against efforts to politicize its scientific mission. In 1972, for example,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health George
Guenther wrote a memorandum proposing that in order to assist
reelecting President Richard Nixon, no controversial safety standards,
such as those involving cotton and dust exposure, "be proposed by
OSHA or NIOSH." 143 Shortly after the Guenther memorandum came to
light, reports surfaced indicating that OSHA had pressured NIOSH 144
to
omit exposure level recommendations in its safety criteria documents.
Professor Joseph Page contemporaneously opined that OSHA was
attempting to obscure the extent to which optimal workplace safety is
compromised in favor of industry protection from adverse economic
impact. 141
Politics as manifested in the appropriations process has also plagued
the agency. During the administration of George W. Bush, the union
representing NIOSH employees complained that since 1980, the last year
of the Carter administration, both Republican and Democratic
146
administrations have undermined the Institute's public health mandate.
That NIOSH's mission has been disregarded, noted the union, is
evidenced by the Institute's diminishing budget over time.1 47 Thus,
NIOSH's budget for fiscal year 2000, in real 2000 dollars
of $215
148
million, was less than NIOSH's 1980 budget of $249 million.
NIOSH has additionally, over the years, grappled with critics in
industry, especially during the years of the so-called Reagan revolution.
142. See generally A Pointless Departure, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/opinion/I1 fri3.html?_r= 1 &oref-slogin (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010); Alison Young, CDC Chief Criticizedfor Pushing Safety Director Out,
ATLANTA
J. CONST.,
July 9, 2008, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/content/metro/stories/2008/07/09/cdcgerberding safetydirector.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2010) (both articles evidencing broad support for NIOSH's work by referencing a
diverse array of stakeholders concerned over the failure, in July 2008, to reappoint
NIOSH Director John Howard for a second term).
143. Joseph A. Page, Toward Meaningful Protection of Worker Health and Safety, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1975). Apparently the plan was never implemented. Id. at
1355.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See THE FUTURE OF NIOSH: A VIEW FROM INSIDE, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL
3840
3-4
(2004),
available at
http://www.lhsfna.org/files/AfgWP13.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id.
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NIOSH's efforts were indeed misaligned with the pro-business agenda of
the Reagan administration, which came to power in 1981.149 During this
period, the Institute turned inward, and its research focused on
uncovering problems, but often neglected potential solutions.' 50 Many in
industry accused NIOSH of insularity, arguing that the Institute was
overly academic and out of touch with the needs of the employers, the
workplace, and OSHA's efforts.'
By 1994, when President Clinton's DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala
appointed Linda Rosenstock as Director of NIOSH, the Institute was
seriously under fire.' 52 NIOSH's moment of crisis arrived in 1995, when
Congressman Thomas Cass Ballenger (R-NC) introduced the Safety and
Health Improvement and Regulatory Reform Act. 53 The main thrust of
the proposed legislation was "to turn OSHA into a cooperative regulator"
that would work with businesses 54 by, inter alia, mandating that fifty
percent of OSHA's appropriation be reserved for consultation,
compliance assistance, training, and education. '55 The bill, however, also
proposed the dissolution of NIOSH, 156 which the Institute's foes
presented "as a solution to its inefficiency, political bias, insufficient
standard development, and over-sized budget."' 57
Ballenger abandoned his effort in 1996, faced with "significant
opposition mobilized by the" AFL-CIO 58 and a threatened Presidential
veto.' 59 Yet, both OSHA and NIOSH were greatly affected by the
experience.16 President Clinton's OSHA, as will be described in Part III,
embarked on an effort to reinvent itself, launching a number of
cooperative initiatives' 6 1 of interest to new governance theorists.

149. See Washam, supra note 44, at 485.
150. See id.
151. Id.; see also From Washington to Westwood: New Dean Brings Her Public
Health Vision to UCLA, UCLA ScH. OF PUB. HEALTH NEWSLETTER 4 (2001) (quoting

former NIOSH Director Linda Rosenstock).
152. From Washington to Westwood, supra note 15 1, at 4.
153. Id.; see also Kovach, et al., supra note 103, at 170.
154. EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 209.
155. Id.
156. See Kovach, et al., supra note 103, at 172.
157. Id. at 181.
158. Howard, supra note 104, at 206.
159. See Kenneth A. Kovach, et al., New Prescriptionsfor a Healthier OSHA, Bus.
HORIZONS, March-April 1997, available at http://findarticies.com/p/articles/mi-m1038/is n2 v40/ai_19685044/?tag=content;coll (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).

160. See EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 209-10; Howard, supra note 104, at 206.
161. See EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 209-1i.
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For NIOSH, in turn, Ballenger's effort was a "near death"
experience. 62 In response, Dr. Rosenstock began a process of
transformation at the Institute, which was continued and expanded by Dr.
Howard.1 63 That process, which will be described in Part III, changed the
way stakeholders viewed agency, creating NIOSH advocates of former
Institute foes.164 In 2004, these new allies would join with others to help
defeat an ideologically-driven effort to demote NIOSH within the CDC
organizational hierarchy. In short, by employing strategic management
techniques to increase the real world significance and impact of its
research, NIOSH bolstered its standing with its stakeholders and its
ability to withstand political threats.

III. THE DEBATE OVER NEW WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE TECHNIQUES
Beginning in the mid-1990s, OSHA and NIOSH began to implement
programs that changed the way the agencies functioned. 165 These efforts,
described below, which appeared promising during the Clinton
administration, played out very differently at the sister agencies during
the Bush administration. More specifically, during the last
administration, OSHA's efforts at creating cooperative programs
designed to incentivize OSH gains faltered and were rendered
cosmetic. 166 In contrast, NIOSH, under the direction of Dr. Howard,
expanded and extended its creative program management with an eye
toward incentivizing real67 world applications and measurable OSH
outcomes for its research. 1
How is one to understand what the agencies hoped to accomplish and
why they performed so differently during the Bush administration, a
period in which deregulation ruled the day? In fact, a relatively recent
theoretical movement-the new governance movement-sheds light on
these questions. Although the concept is far from settled, and its
implications far from uncontroversial, for the purpose of this Article,
new governance implies a range of regulatory techniques marking a shift
away from top-down, adversarial, legalistic, command-and-control forms
of regulation. 168 Although applicable to a broad range of substantive
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Howard, supra note 104, at 206.
Id.
See infra Part 111.
See Howard, supra note 104, at 205-06.
See infra Part III.B. 1.

167. See infra Part IV.
168. See Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND THE US 1, 2 (Grainne

de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
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areas in law, some scholars of labor and employment law have found in
new governance principles a solution to the increasingly uneasy fit
between workplace law and the modem workplaces it is supposed to

govern. 169
Indeed, many scholars-both those subscribing to new governance
theory and those who remain skeptical-trace an increasing inability of
the law to protect working people to a number of factors. First,
increasingly common forms of nontraditional working relationships, such
as the employment of contract workers, temporary workers, and parttime employees, leave many workers without the protection of workplace
law; quite simply, the statutory definition of "employee" renders them
bereft of coverage.1 70 At the same time, the precipitous decline of trade
unionization has increased worker vulnerability, leaving enforcement of
minimum labor standards in the hands of understaffed, under-funded
government regulatory agencies.1 71 Further, the present global crisis is
destabilizing the regulatory environment, which may render employees
reluctant to complain to regulators about workplace conditions for fear of
losing their jobs to business failure or 72even, in some sectors, corporate
relocation outside of the United States.'
New governance scholars, however, also point out several more
general shortcomings of the command-and-control model, the model
upon which most of workplace law is based. First, command-and-control
regulatory systems are tied to cumbersome and ineffective rulemaking
procedures. 173 Second, this model has proven incapable of predicting
future needs and evolving as conditions change over time.' 74 Next,
compliance levels, in areas from tax to environmental law to
169. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Welcome, New Ways of Governing the Workplace:
Proceedings of the 2007 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on
Labor Relations and Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 11 , 111-12
(2007).
170. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS
(1994),
available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/dunlop.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Kay E. Brown, et al., CONTINGENT WORKERS:
INCOME AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF THE REST OF WORKFORCE (2000) available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00076.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Robert E.
Robertson, et al., EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP
ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 21, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (2006).
17 1. See Estlund, supra note 169, at I I1- 12.
172. Id. at 122.
173. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory
State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 822 (2008); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
174. Solomon, supra note 173, at 822; see also Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 278-79 (1998).
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employment discrimination law, are nowhere near what policymakers
would hope.' 75 Lastly, public resources are insufficient thus hindering the
state from enforcing the law, assisting with compliance, or monitoring
conditions to identify needed legal changes. 76 Harking back to the
description in Part II, it is clear that each one of these shortcomings
plagues OSHA's traditional regulatory activities, contributing to the
agency's
poor reputation with many of its stakeholders and the public at77
large.'
As an antidote, new governance scholars recommend new
governance techniques that display a number of common characteristics.
These techniques, for example, aim to foster self-reflection by regulated
parties, active participation of numerous stakeholders, the sharing of
information through best practices, continual learning and revision of
organizational practices, and cooperative engagement with public
authorities. 178 Pointing to regulatory developments in the environment,
education, food safety, and employment, they argue that new governance
has the potential not only to address complex public179policy issues but
also, as executed, to revitalize the democratic process.
Other scholars, however, remain unconvinced that new governance
is a phenomenon to be applauded. Critics of the new governance
movement worry that results from experimental regulatory programs are
mixed.180 Additionally, the costs of these programs can be prohibitive.' 8
Finally, those skeptical of new governance warn that
it may promote
82
compliance that is cosmetic rather than substantive. 1
Such warnings counsel caution in the adoption and promotion of new
governance efforts because, if improperly designed, these programs can
divert scarce public resources away from traditional regulation in favor
of ineffective regulatory window dressing. 183 Over time, however, this
somewhat skeptical author has concluded that there is value in
experimentation, and, in any case, it is unlikely that regulatory
innovation will cease. Thus, rather than argue against these emerging
175. Solomon, supra note 173, at 822.
176. Id.
177. See supra Part II.
178. Grainne de Burca & Scott, supra note 168, at 3.
179. Sturm, supra note 26, at 323.
180. Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 144-45
(2009).
181. Id. at 154-55.
182. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
StructuralTurn and the Limits ofAntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2006).
183. See Krawiec, supra note 180, at 492-93.
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programs, one must be vigilant in assessing their effectiveness through
careful monitoring.184 Moreover, traditional forms of regulation should
not be abandoned; rather they form a necessary backdrop for less
traditional public interventions.
A. New Governance Efforts at OSHA: The VPP and CCP
Regulatory experimentation is certainly in evidence in the United
States and, as noted above, some of these programs have involved OSH
regulation. For example, Cynthia Estlund describes OSHA's Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP), established in 1982 under the Reagan
administration, as an example of an agency harnessing the self-regulatory
capacity of the employers it regulates.' 85 The VPP is aimed at employers
who develop their own comprehensive OSH systems to identify, prevent,
and correct hazardous conditions.' 86 In return for their efforts, and so
long as they maintain below average numbers of occupational injuries
and illnesses, the employers are removed from OSHA's programmed
inspection lists and are not subject to87 OSHA citations for regulatory
violations that are promptly corrected.
The VPP became part of the Clinton administration's Reinventing
Government Initiative.'" In 1995, as part of the initiative, OSHA
announced that the agency was reforming its modus operandi from one
of top-down, command-and-control regulation to a paradigm offering
employers a choice between cooperative partnership with the
government and the traditional regulatory relationship. 8 9 In thinking
about why, among other reasons, OSHA undertook this effort, it helps to
184. A theme of my prior work has been the need for monitoring and accountability to
ensure that employer efforts to eliminate discriminatory policies, practices, and structures
are substantive rather than cosmetic. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our
Boundaries: Transnational Employment Law Practice and the Export of American
Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 257, 279-80
(2004); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 44-47 (2001); see
generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment DiscriminationLaw Practice,26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999).
185. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 343-44 (2005).
186. Id. at 343.
187. See OSHA Fact Sheet: Voluntary Protection Programs (2004), available at
http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data GeneralFacts/factsheet-vpp.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
188. Estland, supra note 185, at 344.
189. Id.; Lobel, Governing OccupationalSafety, supra note 98, at 275.

1226

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1 197

recall Congressman Ballenger's efforts at OSH reform.' 90 Faced with an
effort to gut the agency in order to make it business-friendly under a
regulation-averse Republican majority in Congress, OSHA responded by
demonstrating its capacity to be a cooperative regulator.191
President Clinton's OSHA, however, was not supposed to be a
regulator without teeth. Instead, to provide incentives for cooperation,
the Clinton administration committed itself to maintain and perhaps even
beef up traditional enforcement techniques.' 92 In other words, a potential
threat of top-down regulation was meant to incentivize program
participants to voluntarily make measurable OSH gains.
Obviously, the VPP is designed with the best employers in mind, the
employers who are most likely to cooperate even in the absence of the
threat of state sanction. A thornier problem is how government can
induce voluntary compliance on the part of employers with poor safety
records. Professor Orly Lobel highlights another OSHA innovation
during the Clinton administration, which was designed to reach this
recalcitrant population. 93 Based on a successful pilot program in the
state of Maine, in 1996, OSHA launched its Cooperative Compliance
Program (CCP) in twenty-nine states.' 94 Some 12,500 "relatively
dangerous workplaces" were identified for the program.19'
Employers were contacted and told that given their poor safety
records, they would be put on a primary inspection list and would be
inspected by the end of 1999.196 The companies, however, were
presented with a choice.' 97 They could avoid routine inspection and the
threat of citations by signing an employer participation contract, agreeing
to create and implement a Comprehensive Safety and Health Program,
and, finally, addressing hazards for which no OSHA standards exist,
such as those related to ergonomics. 198
The last requirement, addressing problems for which there are no
OSH standards, met with tremendous industry resistance, perhaps best
exemplified by a successful lawsuit filed by the U.S. Chamber of

190. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
191. See EISNER, ET AL., supra note 48, at 192-93.
192. Estlund, supra note 185, at 344 (noting that the Clinton administration sought "to
preserve and even strengthen traditional adversarial enforcement mechanisms for
employers who put workers at risk").
193. See Lobel, supra note 62, at 1118-19.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1119.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Commerce contesting the program.1 99 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the program, holding that
OSHA, which had adopted the program as a directive rather than a
formal rule subject to notice and comment rulemaking requirements,200had
not observed proper administrative formalities in adopting the CCP.
Despite the blow to regulatory experimentation, Lobel intimates that
the CCP may well have achieved the correct balance between the
promise of cooperation and the threat of government-imposed
penalties.2 °' Indeed, a number of scholars argue that in order for new
governance ideas of cooperation to work, they must be linked to
traditional command and control regulation. 202 Thus, for example, Lobel
is critical of OSHA's cooperative programs under the Bush
administration, which, as will be described below, relied on employer
goodwill without the meaningful threat of government sanction. 20 3 She
characterizes the agency's approach during the last administration as an
abdication by OSHA of its regulatory powers. 2 n
Was Clinton era cooperative programming any better? It is hard to
say. One can definitively state that OSHA's programs during that period
appeared to have potential. The CCP, while based on a seemingly
promising program in Maine, was brought to a halt before its results
could be assessed.2 °5 Thereafter OSHA declined to revive the program,
which it could have done by recreating it following formal rulemaking
procedures.2 °6
The Clinton era VPP and several other OSHA voluntary programs
received a similar assessment by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), which concluded
in a 2004 study that the programs showed
"promising results." 20 7 That study, which was conducted in 2003 and
2004 during the Bush administration, involved a review of some data
from the Clinton era. 0 8 Interviews with employers, workers, OSH
professionals, and public officials indicated that the programs
199. See Solomon, supra note 173, at 827.
200. Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
201. See Estlund, supra note 169, at 116-17 (conference proceedings quoting Orly
Lobel).
202. See id. at 118.
203. Id. at 119.
204. Id.
205. Lobel, supra note 62, at 1122-23.
206. Id. at 1124.
207. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. No. 04-978, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND
HEALTH: OSHA's VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS, BUT
SHOULD BE FULLY EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED (2004), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04378.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
208. Id.at 1-2.
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encouraged improved OSH outcomes. 20 9 The GAO study also noted that
OSHA did not at the time collect comprehensive data on program
effectiveness and that without such information, the agency was
hampered in making sound decisions on resource allocation.21 °
Ultimately, as will be described below, OSHA's failure under the
Bush administration to systematically monitor employers in its voluntary
programs would render those programs purely cosmetic. New
governance theorists warn about such outcomes, noting that without
monitoring and the background threat of sanction, cooperative
programming may be nothing more than a cover for deregulation. 211 Yet,
how closely must new governance efforts be linked to more traditional
forms of regulation? Might there be public agencies without traditional
regulatory powers that nonetheless successfully pursue their missions
and create real world change?
Professor Susan Sturm has conducted a study of the National Science
Foundation that answers the latter question in the affirmative. 2 12 By
reviewing her work on this public intermediary, one may get a sense of
how to gauge the work of NIOSH, and also develop a better
understanding of why, during the Bush administration, NIOSH was able
to continue and build on the Clinton administration's novel
programmatic efforts while OSHA was not.
B. New Governance and Public IntermediariesLike NIOSH
New governance techniques emerging in traditional regulatory
agencies make for interesting study. Perhaps even more interesting are
new governance studies of agencies, like NIOSH, which lack traditional
enforcement power. By describing how these public entities craft
strategies aimed at tackling significant societal problems, researchers
hope to add new tools to the government's arsenal and generate new
thinking about how the state can catalyze real world change.
Two mechanisms by which non-regulatory agencies can positively
influence and incentivize beneficial outcomes are especially applicable to
NIOSH. The first involves agency use of collaborative problem solving
designed to bring into the deliberative process those who are directly
affected by the problems within the agency's jurisdiction. NIOSH's use
of this technique is discussed in subsection 1 below, which reviews the

209. Id.
at 43.
210. Id.
211. Lobel, supra note 62, at 1112.
212. See infra note 214.

2009]

DEREGULATION AND SAFE WORK

1229

Institute's efforts to establish national OSH research priorities through
extensive stakeholder collaboration.
Creative administration of agency grant making authority constitutes
the second mechanism. For example, Professor Susan Sturm's recent
work examines the positive role government grant making can play in
workplace diversification efforts. 2t 3 Sturm's case study of the National
Science Foundation's ADVANCE program, which provides grants to
universities endeavoring to increase the number of women and minorities
on engineering and science faculties, provides a useful analytical
framework for evaluating NIOSH's work during the Bush
administration, 2 4 and is the subject of subsection 2 below.
1. Creatingthe National OccupationalResearch Agenda (NORA)
By 1994, when Clinton era appointee Dr. Rosenstock took the helm
at NIOSH, it was clear the Institute had failed to sufficiently market its
accomplishments to its stakeholders. 1 5 This failure, in turn, put NIOSH's
very existence at risk. Responding to threatened dissolution and potential
funding cuts, Dr. Rosenstock initiated an effort to fashion national
research priorities with the input of organized labor, industry, other
federal science agencies, OSH professionals, and researchers from
216
Meetings were held around the country and about 500
academia.
organizations and individuals working outside of NIOSH participated in
them.2 17
21
8
Primacy was given to openness, inclusiveness, and consensus.
Assisting an initial working group of senior scientists were three external
working groups with diverse stakeholder representation, several internal
NIOSH working groups, and three liaison committees: (1) one devoted to
Corporate outreach, chaired by General Motors; (2) one tasked with
Worker outreach, chaired by the United Auto Workers; and (3) one
designed with broad additional stakeholder outreach in mind, chaired by
the National Safety Council. 2 19 Thirty-one federal agencies or programs
assigned individuals to work on the development process, and a survey
213. Id.
214. See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of lnclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
Higher Education, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 247 (2006).
215. See Howard, supra note 104, at 206-07.

216. Id.
217. See Linda Rosenstock, et al., The National Occupational Research Agenda: A
Model of Broad Stakeholder Input into Priority Setting, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 353

(1998).
218. Id. at 354.
219. Id.

1230

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1 197

of international OSH institutes was drafted and disseminated.220
Information gleaned from the process was used to prepare a draft
National Occupational Research Agenda (NORA), which was distributed
prior to a final meeting in Washington, D.C.22 1
The final National Occupational Research Agenda incorporated input
received at the final meeting, and highlighted twenty-one priority areas
for research.222 In 1996, NIOSH published NORA, its national consensus
agenda,223 thereby introducing a new management model to federal
science agencies. As Dr. Howard notes:
In the NIOSH model of partnership, government actively
solicited stakeholder interest and involvement to set priorities for
scientific research in partnership with both those who are direct
beneficiaries of the health protection provided by the agency
(i.e., American workers), and with those who serve as
intermediaries in achieving the health protection goals through
scientific
research
(i.e,
researchers,
interventionists,
communicators, federal and state governments, academia, safety
and health professions, labor organizations, employer
associations, and print and electronic media).2 24
NORA's creation was a classic new governance effort utilizing
collaborative problem solving to effectuate change, a process undertaken
by NIOSH in the wake of its brush with mortality. As Professor Sturm
notes, "remedying problems of public significance . . . requires
reallocating priorities and power.' '225 A key strategy for such
reallocation, a technique that destabilizes the status quo, is to involve,
through collaboration,
outsiders affected by the problems under
226
consideration.
Collaboration on NORA produced several outcomes. First and most
obviously, diverse stakeholder participation realigned the Institute's
227
research priorities to focus on those most pressing and emerging.
Work on NORA also connected stakeholders more directly to NIOSH
such that the Institute's programmatic success or failure became more

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 355.
223. Howard, supra note 104, at 206.
224. Id.at 207.
225. Sturm, supra note 26, at 329.
226. Id.at 329-30.
227. Rosenstock, et al., supra note 217, at 356.
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228

concretely their own.
Moreover, the collaborative process enhanced
NIOSH's legitimacy and standing with stakeholders, transforming,
especially among industry representatives, foes into supporters. 229 A
reservoir of broad-based stakeholder support was created, and, as will be
described below, deployed to defeat efforts in 2004 to demote the
Institute within the CDC hierarchy.
Finally, the Clinton era efforts regarding NORA produced a strong
foundation upon which to construct a research management system to
incentivize funding relevant research leading to actual OSH
improvements. That management system was launched by Dr. Howard,
who became Director of NIOSH in 2002, and served in the Bush
administration for a period of six years. 230 The system's strategies, its
emphasis on setting measurable outcome goals, the research-to-practice
(r2p) program, and the Institute's embrace of independent scientific
evaluation of NIOSH programs, will be discussed in Part IV. Before that,
however, subsection 2 will review Sturm's work on NSF's ADVANCE
program, a case study that provides further insight into NIOSH's efforts
during the Bush administration.
2. NSF's ADVANCE Programand Creative Use of Grant-Making
Authority
In addition to collaborative problem solving, agencies that lack
traditional regulatory enforcement power, like NIOSH, are beginning to
strategically use their grant-making authority to positively influence real
world outcomes. Professor Susan Sturm's study of the NSF's
ADVANCE program, which provides funding to universities attempting
to diversify their engineering and science faculties, reveals the
components that can make this strategy a success, and thus provides a
framework for evaluating NIOSH's efforts during the Bush years. 23' NSF
is an independent federal agency tasked with promoting research in
science and engineering through grant-making.23 2 Although it does have
a compliance role in the diversity area,233 it is not properly characterized
228. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 330.
229. From Washington to Westwood, supra note 151, at 6.
230. See infra notes 267, 272, and accompanying text.
231. See Sturm, supra note 214.
232. See
Nat'l
Science
Found.,
Who
We
Are,
available
at
http://www.nsf.gov/about/who.jsp (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
233. As an agency that provides public financing for educational programming, NSF
technically has Title IX compliance responsibilities, though it is the Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights that "bears primary responsibility for investigating
complaints at educational institutions." Sturm, supra note 214, at 262 n.55. Title IX of
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as a regulatory agency. Instead, NSF influences234organizational outcomes
through creative involvement with its grantees.
According to Sturm, three key factors enable NSF to influence
diversity outcomes via the ADVANCE program."' First, NSF builds236
a
relationship with grantees based on reciprocity and peer review.
Through negotiated agreements, ADVANCE grantees agree to "shared
goals and responsibilities for information gathering, standard setting,
evaluation and monitoring, and sharing knowledge with the field. 23 7
Indeed, the program requires principal investigators at each university to
collaborate with and evaluate their counterparts at other universities. 8
NSF holds itself accountable through the same independent review
process to which its grantees must submit.239 This reciprocity helps build
a strong relationship between NSF and those universities it funds.
Second, NSF's program is based on capacity building.24 ° In this
respect, NSF helps the universities develop the "knowledge, incentives,
and institutional infrastructure ' 24 1 necessary to achieve faculty
diversification. Additionally, unlike a compliance approach that
penalizes outcomes that deviate from a standard or rule, suboptimal
outcomes at participating universities trigger action to identify problems
and correct them.242 NSF builds accountability into the process by
monitoring the expenditure of grant funds and requiring outside
43
2

review.

Finally, in order to spread its influence beyond the institutions
receiving ADVANCE grants, the NSF leverages its position in the center
of the institutional and professional networks that exist at American
universities. 244 Even if they do not participate in the ADVANCE
program, universities rely on NSF for scientific and engineering research
grants, and are aware of NSF activities more generally. 245 Competitive
pressures, including competition for top scientific and engineering

the Education Amendments of 1972 bans sex discrimination by educational institutions in
academic and athletic programming. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006).
234. See Sturm, supra note 214, at 312-13.
235. See id. at 314.
236. Id.
237. Id
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Sturm, supra note 214, at 316.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 320.
244. Id. at 321.
245. See id.
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faculty, researchers, and students, at least in theory, create incentives for
non-participating universities to address their own gender disparities.246
Moreover, NSF has mainstreamed gender diversity as a core value
by considering as a merit factor how well a grant proposal "'broadens the
participation of under-represented groups.' ', 24 7 While not dispositive in
the awarding of any particular grant, by articulating the way in which the
proposal may broaden participation, a potential grantee may increase the
score given to the proposal, and hence increase the chances for obtaining
NSF funding.248
The ADVANCE program has delivered significant returns at the
University of Michigan, where annual hiring of women science and
engineering faculty has tripled since 2001.249 But, for the purposes of this
Article, NSF's efforts are also generalizable to other agencies even
though those public entities concern themselves with different societal
problems. In short, mechanisms for making creative use of an agency's
grant-making authority are applicable to any institution, public or
private, which provides funding to outside organizations.
Applying ADVANCE program precepts to NIOSH is especially
appropriate given similarities between the agencies. NSF and NIOSH are
comparable in three respects, in that both are agencies: (1) lacking
traditional enforcement powers; (2) whose efforts are devoted to science;
and (3) whose activities include significant grant-making. Indeed, on the
last point, although NIOSH conducts a great deal of intramural research,
seventy-five percent of NIOSH's allocated resources for new research
are used to fund extramural research.25 °
With these similarities in mind, Part IV will use Sturm's three
factors-reciprocity and peer review; capacity building; and leveraging
networks and practice communities-to assess NIOSH's strategic
management reforms during the Bush administration, revealing how the
Institute was able to adhere to its mission and catalyze positive OSH

246. Sturm, supra note 214, at 321.

247. Id. at 321-22 (quoting Notice from Rita R. Colwell, Director, Nat'l Science
Found. to Presidents of Universities and Colleges and Heads of Other National Science
Foundation Grantee Organizations, Merit Review Criteria (Sept. 20, 1999), available at
http://nsf.gov/pubs/1999/iin 125/iin I25.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)).
248. See NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., GRANT PROPOSAL GUIDE CH. 3 (2008), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsfD81/gpg_3.jsp (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
249. Sturm, supra note 214, at 286; see also Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The
Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from CorporateDiversity Programs,30 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 279, 280 (2007).
250. Howard, supra note 104, at 207.
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outcomes despite a lack of traditional regulatory power. That subject, and
OSHA's record during the same period, will be addressed below.
IV. ASSESSING OSHA's AND NIOSH's RECORDS DURING THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION

Examining OSHA's and NIOSH's respective records during the
Bush administration reminds one of folktales about siblings whose
motives and dispositions are diametrical: one sibling is greedy and only
interested in self-advancement while the other is good natured and tries
to do right. In OSHA's case, however, the agency's disposition, at least
at the top, was best characterized as greedy on behalf of corporate
interests and predisposed to a radical deregulatory agenda. NIOSH, in
turn, comes across as doing its best, given limited means and a lack of
regulatory power, to address emerging OSH issues and to get the results
of scientific inquiry into the hands of those who might use them.
One partial explanation for these disparate records is the sensitivity
of traditional regulatory agencies to regime change in the White House
and in Congress. As noted above, OSHA's leadership has historically
been responsive to the ideology and political agenda of the White
House.25 1 Such vulnerability has been noted regarding other enforcement
agencies. For example, one study of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), the agency responsible for assessing
the equal employment opportunity programs of federal contractors,
found the work of the agency greatly impacted by the deregulatory
movement of the Reagan years in the 1980s. 252 Those effects are
produced in part by changes in resources-the OFCCP's budget was
slashed and its staff halved during the Reagan years 253-and also,
undoubtedly by changes in regulatory agency leadership and the degree
to which certain stakeholder groups, for example employers, are able to
assert their own agendas given the political climate of the time.
The link between the last two factors-agency leadership and the
ability of stakeholders to influence agency actions-is illuminated by
considering the ideological orientation OSHA's and NIOSH's leaders
during the Bush years. For example, John Henshaw, the Bush
administration's first head of OSHA, early in his tenure at the agency
251. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
252. See Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in
Private Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855 (2006) (noting the sensitivity of the OFCCP to presidential
regime change).
253. Id. at 863.
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allegedly stated staff should view employers as OSHA's real
customers. 25 4 A former industrial hygienist for agricultural giant
Monsanto, Henshaw in his first two years withdrew twenty-six draft
regulations from OSHA's calendar and, in harmony with the Republican
majority in Congress, assisted in the rescission of the Clinton-era
ergonomics rule.25 5 To explain his actions, Henshaw has noted "there
wasn't a whole lot of political will for more rules and burdens on
industry.

2 56

Similarly, Edwin Foulke, Jr., who in 2006 became OSHA's second
chief during the Bush administration, refers to himself as a "true Ronald
257
Reagan Republican" who "firmly believes in limited government.,
Foulke, a management-side labor lawyer and Republican Party
fundraiser, before his OSHA appointment, opposed OSH regulations on
behalf of clients like the Chamber of Commerce. 258 In place of inspection
and enforcement activities, both before and during his time as head of the
agency, Foulke primarily promoted OSHA's voluntary compliance
programs and corporate self-regulation.2 59
A deregulatory, pro-industry ideology was in great evidence at
OSHA during the Bush years. Critiques of OSHA's record during that
time, based on reports by the agency's career staff, reveal the withdrawal
of proposed workplace regulations by political appointees, 260 the
deliberate delay of others, 26' and the modification of warnings in

254. R. Jeffrey Smith, Under Bush, OSHA Mired in Inaction, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
2008, at A 1.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Stephen Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety in the Hands of Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at I (quoting Edwin Foulke, Jr.).
258. Id. Writing about the Clinton-era Ergonomics Program Standard as a management
attorney, for example, Foulke noted the rule's "potential [to] unfairly saddl[e] employers
with responsibility for [musculoskeletal disorders] that are not directly attributable to the
job." Edwin G. Foulke & Robert M. Wood, An Introduction to the New OSHA
Ergonomics Program Standard, 12 S.C. LAw. 27 (2001). This was a common industry
criticism of the rule.
259. Labaton, supra note 257, at 1.
260. For example, political appointees at OSHA, responding to concerns voiced by
large hospitals, scuttled a tuberculosis regulation, which agency career staff had
previously concluded could avert up to 32,700 infections and 190 fatalities, and save
$115 million. Smith, supra note 254, at AI. Political appointees also stopped work on a
long-pending regulation of "ionizing radiation in mailrooms, food warehouses, and
hospitals and airports," citing "resource constraints and other priorities." Id.
261. A notable example of rulemaking delay involved OSHA's promulgation of a final
rule on workplace personal protective equipment (PPE). See Katherine Torres, OSHA
Issues Final PPE Rule, EHS TODAY, Nov. 15, 2007, available at
http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/ehsimp_75950% (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). First
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response to industry pressure. a62 According to one estimate, President
Bush's OSHA issued eighty-six percent fewer significant rules and
regulations from 2001 through 2007 as compared to a period of similar
length during the Clinton administration.26 3 Hearings conducted by
Congress reveal legislators aghast at how poorly the agency
performed.2 6 Media reports suggest both a decided bias in favor of
industry by top OSHA administrators and incompetence in the agency's
top administration. 265 Moreover, cosmetic rather than actual regulation
ruled the day. For example, an enhanced inspection program aimed at
announced in 1997 and formally proposed in 1999 under the Clinton administration, the
rule places the burden of paying for PPE on employers rather than leaving employees
vulnerable to demands that they shoulder the costs of protecting their occupational safety
and health. Id. Getting OSHA to issue the rule in final form, however, was no easy task.
During the Bush administration, OSHA repeatedly postponed rulemaking. See id. In
order to spur agency action, in January 2007, a lawsuit was filed against the Department
of Labor by the AFL-CIO and the United Food and Commercial Workers. Id.
Additionally, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard and Congressman George Miller
introduced legislation to require employers to pay for PPE. Id. These actions apparently
prompted the sluggish agency to act. OSHA issued its final rule on PPE in November
2007. Id.
262. See Smith, supra note 254, at Al. One example involves the modification of a
warning aimed at dental technicians "that they could be exposed to dangerous beryllium
alloys while grinding fillings." Id. OSHA political appointees gave a proposed special
bulletin on beryllium exposure, prepared by career staff, to a lobbying firm employed by
the nation's largest beryllium manufacturer. Id. Those top OSHA officials ultimately,
over the opposition of career staff, published the bulletin "with a footnote challenging a
key recommendation the [lobbying] firm opposed." Id.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Hidden Tragedy: Underreporting of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. (2008), archived
webcast
available at http://edlabor.house.gov/hearings/2008/06/hidden-tragedyunderreporting.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Is OSHA Failingto Adequately Enforce
Construction Safety Rules? Hearing Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th
Cong.
(2008),
archived webcast
available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/hearings/2008/06/is-osha-failing-to-adequately.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Have
OSHA Standards Failed to Kept up with Workplace Hazards? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Workforce Protections,110th Cong. (2007), archivedwebcast available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/hearings/2007/04/have-osha-standards-kept-up-wi.shtm
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
265. See Smith, supra note 254, at AI; see also Labaton, supra note 257, at 1. One
example of apparent incompetence was Edwin Foulke's procurement of an efficiency
consultant from Foulke's home state of South Carolina via a no-bid contract. See Stephen
Lee, DOL IG Accuses OSHA of No-Bid Contract, Award, Improper Payments to
Consultant, DAILY LAB. REP., (BNA) Al5, (Apr. 6, 2009). The consultant was paid
$681,379 in labor and travel costs for twenty-seven months of work, failed to furnish
OSHA with a record of services and hours worked. Id. A recent report by the Department
of Labor's Inspector General's office found the procurement of the consultant's services
improper. Id.

20091

DEREGULATIONAND SAFE WORK

1237

recalcitrant employers and launched by the Bush administration's OSHA
was recently deemed shoddily administered.2 66
The ideological orientation of NIOSH's leadership during this time
was far different. For six of the eight years of the Bush administration the
Institute was directed by a career public health administrator and former
professor. 267 John Howard, before becoming the Institute's director,
spent over a decade as chief of the Division of Occupational Safety and
Health in California's Department of Industrial Relations.26 8 Before that
he was a professor of environmental
and occupational medicine at the
269
University of California at Irvine.
A review of Dr. Howard's writings, including an essay, The Future
of OccupationalSafety and Health, written in November 2008 after his
departure as the Bush administration's NIOSH chief, reveals a highly
nuanced view of the regulatory challenges attendant to safeguarding
employees in the twenty-first century.2 70 Included among the new
economy issues raised by Howard in that essay are the need to account
for changing workforce demographics, in terms of increases in age and
immigration, the changing structure of employment, in particular the rise
of temporary and contingent employment, the increase of new
technologies like nanotechnology, and how, given the slow pace of
standards development, we might create a sustainable approach to
occupational safety and health regulation. 27' Dr. Howard's ideological
orientation, unlike the two men who led OSHA during the Bush years,

puts workers' welfare at the center.
Indeed, the occasion of Dr. Howard's untimely ouster by the Bush
administration, which in 2008 declined to reappoint him to a second six266. A recent Department of Labor Inspector General's review of OSHA's enhanced
inspection program "found that employers with reported fatalities were not always
identified and inspected by" OSHA as required by the program. OSHA's Failure to
Implement Enhancement ProgramMay Have Cost Lives, Report Says, DAILY LAB. REP.,
(BNA) A16, (Apr. 3, 2009). The audit, which analyzed program performance from
October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2008, determined that the agency failed to conduct
required inspections, follow-up inspections, and enhanced settlement activities for ninetyseven percent of employers who qualified for the program.
267. See James Nash, John Howard Appointed New Director of NIOSH, EHS TODAY,
Jun. 25, 2002, available at http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs-imp 35587/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2010).
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See John Howard, The Future of OccupationalSafety and Health, Nov. I, 2008
(paper presented at the 75th Anniversary of the International Safety Equipment
Association), availableat www.google.com (accessed by inserting "John Howard", "The
Future of Occupational Safety and Health" in the Search field, hyperlink, select
quickview) (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
271. See id. at 3, 6, 7.
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year term, provides a glimpse of the esteem in which he was held by a
broad array of stakeholders.2 72 A New York Times editorial noted that
both the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce had argued for Dr.
Howard's reappointment, as had the American Society of Safety
Engineers and the American Industrial Hygiene Association.273 The latter
274
referred to Howard as "the most respected leader in NIOSH's history.
Several of New York State's congressional representatives and then New
York Governor David Patterson, impressed with Dr. Howard's
leadership on health programs for so-called "9/11 workers" experiencing
illness after working at ground zero, unsuccessfully attempted to
intervene.2 75 Such an outpouring of support indicates Dr. Howard ran an
agency widely perceived as effective at pursuing its mission.
Below, this Article compares OSHA's and NIOSH's performance in
two different ways. First, it uses a case study to examine how each
agency adhered to its traditional mission. More specifically, subsection A
reviews OSHA's and NIOSH's responses to the emergence of a rare and
devastating lung disease, bronchiolitis obliterans, linked to inhalation of
the flavoring additive diacetyl by microwave popcorn factory workers.276
The popcorn lung case study is a tale of a regulatory agency, OSHA,
abandoning its mission, while its research counterpart, NIOSH remained
true to its task.
One might argue, however, that this comparison is inapt. In other
words, contrasting OSHA's regulatory performance with NIOSH's
research performance might be akin to comparing apples and oranges.
Certainly OSHA is subject to far greater internal and external political
pressure than is NIOSH. This is likely because OSHA can in theory
impose costs on industry through the regulatory process while NIOSH,
which lacks such enforcement powers, cannot. 277 It isthus not surprising
that OSHA proved, during the Bush administration, much more sensitive
to regulatory capture than NIOSH.27 8 Political forces aligned with
industry, for example, both inside and outside government, care less

272. See A PointlessDeparture,supra note 142.
273. Id.

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
277. Indeed, NIOSH's reputation for scientific objectivity has suffered during times
when it has been "highly responsive to OSHA's [regulatory] needs." Greenwood, supra
note 51, at 124.
278. This Article, which compares OSHA's and NIOSH's records during the Bush
administration, demonstrates the greater susceptibility to capture of the traditional
regulator in comparison to its research counterpart.
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about NIOSH adhering to its mission because the Institute poses less of
an economic threat.
To address that concern and provide an alternative comparison, this
Article will also evaluate OSHA's and NIOSH's soft-law programming
during the Bush years. Subsection B thus reviews OSHA's cooperative
compliance programming under the leadership of Mr. Henshaw and Mr.
Foulke. Subsection C evaluates NIOSH's efforts during the Bush
administration to build on new governance efforts begun during the
Clinton administration. Ultimately, even in its soft law programming
efforts, OSHA succumbed to a radical deregulatory impetus while
NIOSH's efforts made documented gains for workers.
A. PopcornLung: A Case Study of DifferentialAgency Response
How did OSHA and NIOSH adhere to their missions during the
Bush administration? Assessing the agencies' respective responses to the
emergence of a new occupational health risk, that of diacetyl, a butter
flavoring additive in microwave popcorn, demonstrates OSHA's
willingness to sacrifice employee health in the name of employer selfregulation and NIOSH's determination to minimize worker illness by
making scientific results available to those most affected by exposure to
the additive.
In 2000, at the end of the Clinton administration, an outbreak of a
rare lung disease among several microwave popcorn plant workers in
Missouri prompted a local physician to contact state health authorities,
who in turn contacted OSHA and NIOSH.27 9 In August 2000, NIOSH
began an investigation at one popcorn plant, including health evaluations
of ninety percent of the plant's employees, discovering that their rate of
chronic respiratory problems was 2.6 times the national average and
finding sky-high concentrations of diacetyl in the work environment.280
279. Labaton, supra note 257, at 1. For a detailed description of bronchiolitis

obliterans, which in the case of popcorn workers became known as "popcorn lung," see
Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn Lung Case Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87, 88-90 (2009). The disease, caused by, among other
things, inhalation of diacetyl, leaves its victims with irreversible obstruction of their
bronchioles, manifesting itself in "a severely reduced ability to breathe." Id. at 90. Once
the disease advances beyond its early stages, lung transplant becomes the only viable

treatment. Id. at 89.
280. David Michaels, et al., A Case of Regulatory Failure - Popcorn Workers Lung,
July 2006, at 2, available at http://www.defendingscience.org/casestudies/A-Case-ofRegulatory-Failure-Popcorn-Workers-Lung.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). The results
of NIOSH's study at the factory were published in the New EnglandJournalof Medicine.
See Kathleen Kreiss, et al., ClinicalBronchiolitis Obliterans in Workers at a MicrowavePopcorn Plant, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 330 (2002).
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That December, NIOSH published interim recommendations indicating
workers should wear respirators until engineering controls to eliminate
diacetyl exposure could be developed. 281 NIOSH spent the next year
working with the company on control measures and monitoring
employee health.28 2
In September 2001, during the first year of the Bush administration,
NIOSH representatives returned to the plant to meet with workers and
inform them that lung disease was being caused by work-related factors
in the plant. 283 Thereafter, NIOSH undertook laboratory research and onsite evaluation at ten different microwave popcorn facilities. 284 By the
summer of 2002, NIOSH had presented its findings on the link between
diacetyl and bronchiolitis obliterans to OSHA, state health authorities,
and the flavoring industry. 285 In December 2003, NIOSH issued an alert
to 4000 businesses that make or use diacetyl, informing those employers
about the connection between the flavoring and the lung condition,
suggesting possible safeguards, and asking them to alert their workers to
the danger.286 That document was posted on the NIOSH website, where it
remains today.287 NIOSH provided further briefings on its findings to
OSHA "at a conference of top OSHA officials and compliance officers
in December 2004. "288 At the present time, the Institute continues its
work on bronchiolitis obliterans and its link to diacetyl. 289 Thus, in
confronting an emerging health hazard, NIOSH remained true to its
mission: the Institute identified the hazard and potential safeguards
against it, worked to disseminate that knowledge among those affected
by it, and passed relevant data to OSHA, its regulatory counterpart.
OSHA's response could not have been more different. Rather than
issue a temporary emergency standard or invoke the OSH Act's general
duty clause, either of which could have been used to require relevant
employers to reduce or eliminate the diacetyl hazard, OSHA chose to

281. Michaels, et al., supra note 280, at 2.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Andrew Schneider, Disease is Swift, Response is Slow, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 23,
2006, at 1, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/baidisease042306,0,7428212.story (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
286. See Michaels, et al., supra note 280, at 2.
287. See NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PREVENTING LUNG
DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE OR MAKE FLAVORINGS (NIOSH 2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2004-1 10/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
288. Schneider, supra note 285, at 5.
289. Dulberg, supra note 279, at 98.
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address the popcorn lung crisis through voluntary, self-regulation.290 In
September 2002, a so-called alliance agreement was initiated between
OSHA's regional office in Kansas City and The Popcorn Board, a trade
association of the popcorn industry. The agreement provided that the
Popcorn Board would provide OSHA with a mailing list of its members
so that OSHA could send them information on the "potential adverse
health effects" of diacetyl. 29' A separate provision in the agreement gave
the Board an opportunity to provide feedback on a draft OSHA Hazard
Information Bulletin, which was supposed to be prepared for internal
distribution at the agency.2 92 The agreement, which contained no
enforcement component, no mechanism for employee or trade union
involvement, no provision for participation by public health
professionals, was concluded in March 2003.293
Faced with agency inaction and hundreds of ill workers in several
states, 294 in 2006, the United Food and Commercial Workers and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters petitioned OSHA for a
temporary emergency standard for the additive. 295 Appended to the
petition was a letter signed by over forty respected scientists and former
government officials.29 6
OSHA responded with its refusal one year later, noting a dearth of
evidence that a standard was "'necessary' and 'would be technologically
and economically feasible,' or that 'current exposures constitute a grave
danger.'''297 In April 2007, Edwin Foulke, testifying at a Congressional
hearing, in terms reminiscent of the Bush administration's position on
global warming, described the science on diacetyl as "murky," but told
298
lawmakers OSHA would prepare a safety bulletin on popcorn lung.
That same month, years after NIOSH first reported its findings on the
290. Michaels, et al., supra note 280, at 3; see also David Michaels & Celeste
Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty
and the Demise of the FormalRegulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 17, 29 (2005).
291. Michaels, et al., supra note 280, at 3; Michaels & Monforton, supra note 290, at
29-30.
292. See Michaels, et al., supra note 280, at 3.
293. Id.
294. Many of the workers brought suit against chemical companies that sold diacetyl.
For a description of the legal theories upon which they have sued, see Dulberg, supra
note 279, at 99-106.
295. Labaton, supra note 257, at I.
296. Dulberg, supra note 279 at 108.
297. Id.at 108-09 (citing Letter from Edwin G. Foulke, Jr., Assistant Sec'y of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health, to James Hoffa, Gen. President, Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters
(Sept.
25,
2007)
available at
http://defendingscience.org/case studies/upload/OSHA Petition Denial.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
298. Labaton, supra note 257, at I.
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link between diacetyl and popcorn lung disease, OSHA launched a
national emphasis program to target inspection resources to microwave
popcorn manufacturers.299
Pressure to prompt OSHA to regulate butter flavoring via a standard,
however, continued. In June 2007, Congressional Representative Lynne
C. Woolsey (D-CA) introduced legislation requiring the reluctant agency
"to issue an emergency interim standard for diacetyl "within ninety days
of passage and a permanent standard within two years."300 OSHA and the
White House weighed in against the bill, with Edwin Foulke arguing that
it did not provide sufficient protection for workers, was inappropriate as
it bypassed the administrative process, and failed to account for other
uses of diacetyl outside the popcorn industry.30 1 Industry opponents of
the legislation echoed OSHA's position that the scientific evidence was
unclear, and that more time was needed to study popcorn lung.30 2 A
coalition of industry groups also argued that regulation was unnecessary
because some microwave popcorn manufacturers planned to cease using
diacetyl.3 °3
Two days before the House of Representatives was scheduled to vote
on Woolsey's bill, OSHA preempted the legislation by announcing the
initiation of rulemaking.30 4 No doubt Edwin Foulke intended that process
to exceed the timetable in Woolsey's bill. In fact, the Bush years ended
30 5
without the adoption of a regulation or standard on diacety.
Commenting on the sister agencies' actions on popcorn lung during the
eight years of the Bush administration, Dr. David Michaels, who was
recently confirmed as President Obama's Assistant Secretary of Labor
for OSHA,3 °6 noted "[h]ere you have one federal agency, [NIOSH],
doing a great job exploring the science behind a problem and a second

299. Katherine Torres, OSHA Launches Diacetyl Program, EHS TODAY, Apr. 25,
2007, available at http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/ehs-imp_54818/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2010).
300. Dulberg, supra note 279, at 111.
301. Seeid. at 116.
302. See id.
303. Id.
304. Id.at 117.
305. The Obama administration's OSHA continues to work on the issue. Reports
indicate "OSHA will initiate a peer review of health effects and risk assessment on
diacetyl in October 2010." OSHA Fall2009 Agenda includes 29 regulatory items, HESA
- News, Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://hesa.etuirehs.org/uk/newsevents/newsfiche.asp?pk-1337 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
306. Stephen Lee, Senate Votes Unanimously to Confirm David Michaels as OSHA
Administrator, DAILY LABOR REP., (BNA) A-10,(Dec. 7,2009).
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agency, OSHA, which is supposed to be moving
forward with
30 7
enforcement and standard setting, and they are not."
Clearly, as exemplified by the popcorn lung case study, OSHA, the
command and control regulator, proved highly susceptible to
deregulatory ideology and regulatory capture during the Bush
administration. NIOSH, in contrast, remained true to its mission.
Beyond demonstrating the differences in the sister agencies' records,
however, the popcorn lung case study also represents a cautionary tale.
Academics writing about regulatory strategy, technique, and innovation
must be mindful that the prevailing political environment can exert
considerable pressure on agency performance. As noted regarding OSHA
and OFCCP, some agencies are quite responsive to political regime
change. Given recent political history, researchers should be especially
concerned with how agencies will operate in troubled times-times when
the state appears hostile to the concept of regulation itself. It is during
those times that at least some soft-law structures demonstrate their
sustainability. The sections below will describe in more detail how sister
agencies OSHA and NIOSH operated such programs in such troubled
times.
B. OSHA's VPP Revisited
Critics and others reviewing OSHA's record during the Bush
administration often noted the agency's emphasis on voluntary
compliance programs and employer self-regulation, an emphasis which,
some argued, came at the expense of enforcement efforts.308 OSHA itself
evidenced pride in its cooperative programming in a report issued at the
end of the Bush administration:
OSHA would prefer to help a business prevent injuries, illnesses,
and fatalities, rather than answer a single call about a workplace
307. Labaton, supra note 257, at I (quoting Dr. David Michaels).
308. See, e.g., Worker Safety and Health, in TURN AROUND AMERICA: AFL-CIo
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 1, (report produced for and

submitted to the Obama-Biden Transition Project, Dec. I1 2008, available at
http://otrans.3cdn.net/8374940c2f2d5I4f7 ltym6i6o5k.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)
("Voluntary compliance has been favored over enforcement, and the Administration has
promoted building partnerships and alliances with employers and shut workers and
unions out of agency programs and deliberations.")); Labaton, supra note 257, at 2
("Instead of regulations, Mr. Foulke and top officials at other agencies favor a 'voluntary
compliance strategy,' reaching agreements with industry associations and companies to
police themselves."); DEATH ON THE JOB 2009, supra note 106, at I ("For eight years, the
Bush administration failed to take action to address major safety and health problems...
.Voluntary efforts were favored over strong enforcement.").
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tragedy. Therefore, OSHA offers a number of opportunities for
businesses and organizations to work cooperatively with the
Agency

.

.

.

OSHA extends a helping hand by providing

compliance assistance. A wide range of cooperative programs
are tailor-made to help businesses and organizations improve
their safety and health performance and provide recognition for
their successes.

°9

One program highlighted by the OSHA report was the Voluntary
Protection Program, which has been described above. That program
allows employers who develop their own comprehensive OSH systems
and maintain below average numbers of occupational injuries and
illnesses to avoid programmed OSHA inspections. 3 10 VPP participants
are additionally not 3subject
to OSHA citations for promptly corrected
11
regulatory violations.
President Bush's OSHA described the VPP as "promot[ing] effective
worksite-based safety and health by setting performance-based
criteria. '3 12 The agency also noted that the VPP "showcases employers
who provide exemplary employee protection., 313 As for program
outcomes, OSHA noted that "[i]n 2006, VPP participants avoided
approximately 6,400 Days Away Injury cases, saving these sites an
estimated $243 million. '' 3 14 According to the report, program participants
also experienced on average, total case incident rates and DART (Days
Away from work, Restricted work or job Transfer injury and illness)
"rates that are 53 percent and 49 percent below the Bureau of Labor
Statistics average for their industry. 315
OSHA's faith in the VPP program is illustrated by the significant
increase in the number of employer worksites participating in it during
the Bush years.316 Between 2003 and 2008, the number of VPP sites
more than doubled, from 1039 to 2174. 3' 7 These increases were fueled by
309.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA FACT BOOK: OSHA ADDS VALUE

WORK AND LIFE 32 (2008), available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/OSHAfact-book-stohler.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
310. See supra Part III.A.
311. Id.
312. OSHA FACT BOOK, supra note 309, at 35.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 36.
315. Id. at 35.
TO

BUSINESS,

316. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OSHA'S VOLUNTARY PROTECTION
PROGRAMS: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS WOULD BET-rER ENSURE PROGRAM

QUALITY 7 (2009) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS].

317. Id.
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several industries. For example, chemical industry worksites increased
43% from 2003 to 2008, motor freight transportation worksites increased
900%, and electric, gas, and sanitary services sites increased 300%.318
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report noted
that a central factor influencing these increases was OSHA's decision to
expand the VPP. 319 Bush administration Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao,
for example, announced in 2003 the expansion of eligibility criteria so
that greater numbers of employers could participate.320 The OSHA
regions were given "targets for the number of new sites to be approved
each year.",32 1 Thus, the agency clearly made a conscious decision to
devote its resources to these programs.
322
Until recently, however, good data was lacking on VPP outcomes.
Indeed, writing in November 2008, not long after his NIOSH
reappointment was rejected, Dr. John Howard wondered about the
budgetary impact of supporting the more than 2000 VPP worksites and
queried whether a program evaluation had been conducted to determine
the return on that budgetary investment. 323 Extending his thoughts to
OSHA's industry and employer alliances and partnerships hc asked
whether these efforts really
produce concrete results or are instead "a
324
form of public relations."
While some of Dr. Howard's queries remain unanswered, the GAO
report mentioned above provides some definitive answers regarding the
administration of the VPP during the Bush years. 325 In short, GAO
concluded OSHA lacked internal controls to ensure only qualified
employers became and remained VPP participants. 326 Both the minimal
documentation requirements of the VPP and OSHA's failure to ensure
regional offices complied with VPP policies were deemed significant
failings.327
GAO was particularly concerned about two aspects of the VPP. First,
OSHA, during the study period, did not require the OSHA regions to
document their own actions in response to fatalities and serious injuries
at VPP sites. 328 While the VPP Manual requires the OSHA regions to
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 8.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Howard, supra note 270, at 8.
See id.
Id.

325. VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS, supra note 316, at 12.

326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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review employer OSH systems after such incidents to determine whether,
among other things, the site should be removed from the program, the
regions were not required "to document their decisions or actions taken
in the VPP files. ' 329 This system deficiency, noted GAO, prevented
OSHA's national office from determining
whether regional staff
330
administered the program appropriately.
In concrete terms, for the period from January 2003 to August 2008,
GAO found a lack of documentation of regional OSHA staff actions in
thirty of thirty-two fatality cases occurring at VPP sites. 33' To determine
OSHA regional staff actions, GAO conducted interviews, which
determined that five of the thirty sites were placed on one-year
conditional status, five more of the thirty sites voluntarily withdrew from
the VPP, and OSHA staff permitted seventeen of the thirty sites to
remain in the program.332 One of the seventeen sites permitted to remain
in the VPP sustained three occupational fatalities in the five-year period
under review. 333 Another was assessed ten violations related to a fatality,
including seven deemed serious and one regarding discrepancies in the
employer's injury and illness logs. 334 Thus, as the report notes, "sites that
did not meet the definition of the VPP's Star program to 'successfully
protect employees
from fatality, injury, and illness' have remained in the
335
program."
Second, GAO found OSHA had neglected to develop performance
goals and measures to assess the VPP's effectiveness.336 With regard to
this concern, OSHA officials told GAO that VPP site injury and illness
rates, which average approximately fifty percent below their industries'
average, are the best measure of the VPP's performance.33 7 Yet GAO
found reason to doubt those statistics, noting that "for 35 percent of the
sites [reviewed], there were discrepancies between the injury and illness
rates reported by the sites and the rates noted in OSHA's regional on-site
review reports for the same time periods., 338 Additionally, OSHA failed

329. Id.
330. Id.

331.
332.
OSHA
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS,

supra note 316, at 13.

Id. Three of the thirty sites had not been reviewed by regional staff because
enforcement staff needed to complete investigations of those sites. Id. at 13-14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS, supra note 316, at 15-16.

Id.
Id.

2009]

DEREGULATION AND SAFE WORK

1247

and
to rigorously evaluate the impact of the VPP on participants' illness
339
non-participants.
are
that
sites
similar
to
compared
as
injury rates
Midway through the Bush years, the Clinton-era cooperative efforts
were deemed by GAO to show promising results. 340 By the end of the
Bush administration, GAO concluded that OSHA permitted unqualified
employers to remain in the VPP, failed to provide sufficient oversight
and internal controls for the program, and neglected to establish much
needed performance goals and measures.34 ' So committed was President
Bush's OSHA to principles of deregulation and employer self-regulation
that it rendered its soft-law cooperative programming purely cosmetic.
Administrative actions speak loudly in this case. OSHA leadership,
during the Bush administration, was interested in making the VPP's
about whether those
benefits available to employers but indifferent
342
not.
or
benefits
those
deserved
employers
C. NIOSH's Efforts to Make OSH Research and Programming
Transparent,Relevant, and Outcome-Oriented
Unlike OSHA, which resisted its role as a traditional regulator during
the Bush years and emasculated its cooperative programming, NIOSH
continued and built upon the Clinton-era efforts which produced the
National Occupational Research Agenda.3 43 For NIOSH, the Bush years
were marked by efforts to increase programmatic transparency, ensure
OSH research relevance, and create research outcome goals that were
measurable.344

339. Id.
340. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 328-38 and accompanying text.
342. The Obama administration's OSHA responded to the GAO report with a press
release, which noted plans for a comprehensive evaluation of the VPP "to determine how
the agency should best allocate its resources among cooperative programs, enforcement
and the agency's other activities." U.S. Dep't of Labor, US. Department of Labor's
OSHA Begins Evaluation of Voluntary Protection Programs, OSHA OFFICE OF
at
http://www.osha.gov/plsavailable
18,
2009,
June
COMMUNICATIONS,
=
(last
/oshaweb/owadisp.showdocument?p table=NEWS RELEASES-&pid 18065

visited Jan. 22, 2010). A recent memo issued by OSHA's then Acting Assistant Secretary
of Labor Jordan Barab announced a series of improvements geared to respond to the
GAO Report's criticisms of the VPP. See Following GAO Criticism, OSHA Memo
Outlines Compliance Program Improvements, DAILY LAB. REP., (BNA) A7, (Aug. 18,
2009).
343. See supra Part IV.
344. See id.
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1. MeasuringNIOSH's Effectiveness - Part2
As noted above, during the Bush administration, NIOSH took
significant steps to expand and enhance its mission beyond its support
work for the standard-setting activities of other OSH agencies.345 In the
process, the Institute became a more nimble, accountable agency, more
engaged with its stakeholders, and better positioned to meet the OSH
challenges of the new economy. These ends were accomplished by
employing five strategies that aimed to make the Institute's research and
programming transparent, relevant, and outcome-oriented.34 6 As noted by
Dr. Howard:
(1) all programs conducted by NIOSH were gathered together
into a portfolio of programs; (2) each program formulated a set
of measurable outcome goals in partnership with relevant
stakeholders; (3) each program in the portfolio, even if its
science was more basic science than applied, had to have a
research to practice (r2p) focus; (4) a process existed to provide
startup funding for emerging risk issues like nanotechnology;
and (5) each program's
research activities had to undergo
347
independent evaluation.
After conducting an extensive inventory of all Institute research
programs, NIOSH created the NIOSH Program Portfolio, consisting of
thirty-two outcome-oriented programs divided among two categories.
Eight programs track major economic sectors-agriculture, construction,
health care, manufacturing, mining, services, wholesale and retail trade,
and transportation. 349 The remaining programs, which are applicable
across industrial sectors, focus on adverse OSH outcomes, 350 statutory
programs under NIOSH's jurisdiction,3 51 and programs of great import to
NIOSH and its stakeholders. 5 2 Additionally, each program partnered
with stakeholders and reached agreement on an agenda with measurable

345. See supra Part IV.A.

346. Howard, supra note 104, at 208.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. These include "cancer, respiratory diseases, and traumatic injuries." Id.
351. Included in this category are NIOSH health hazard evaluations and radiation dose
reconstruction. Id.
352. In this category are "emergency preparedness and response, personal protective
technology, and stress and work organization." Howard, supra note 104, at 208.
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ultimate outcomes, 354 or measurable intermediate
outputs, 35335measurable
5
outcomes.
An important dimension of these efforts was an emphasis on
"research to practice" or r2p; in other words, a central focus of the
research effort is on translating findings into real OSH improvements.
Thus, no matter how theoretical the science involved, in comparison to
research that is applied, each program was required to plan to transfer the
results of its research into actual OSH practice.35 6
Also important for NIOSH's new approach was to plan, through
careful budgeting, for the funding of emerging OSH issues during times
of resource scarcity. NIOSH thus requires contingent budgeting by its
divisions to take into account, among other things, a budgetary shortfall
of four percent. 357 This approach to funding gives NIOSH the flexibility
to provide initial funding to cutting-edge issues of concern as they
become evident.
The final noteworthy aspect of NIOSH's scientific management
approach during the Bush years was subjecting its programming to
outside, independent evaluation by the National Academies, specifically
to determine program relevance and impact. 358 Work began in 2005 and
ended in 2008, with eight programs, whose funding represents a majority
of NIOSH's budget, receiving evaluation reports. 359 Each program
evaluated was responsible for developing an implementation plan based
on the National Academies' findings and recommendations, seeking
stakeholder input on its plan, and then integrating the implementation
plan into its strategic plan for the future. 360 The latter is reviewed
annually to assess progress36 toward accomplishing the National
Academies' recommendations. 1
While these efforts are descriptively impressive, applying the three
factors from Sturm's NSF study-reciprocity and peer review; capacity
building; and leveraging networks and practice communities-reveals, in
new governance terms, why they were effective and also how they might
353. Measurable outputs include the production of research papers and presentations at
scientific meetings. Id.
354. Ultimate outcomes include reductions in particular injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities. Id.
355. Intermediate outcomes include the reduction in the risk of particular injuries,
illnesses, and fatalities. Id.
356. Id. at 209.
357. See id at 210.
358. Howard, supra note 104, at 211.
359. See id. at 211.
360. See id. at 212-13.
361. Id. at 213.
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be improved. The ADVANCE program represents a successful nonregulatory agency effort at creative use of its grant-making authority and
its influence with networks and practice communities. NIOSH also has
the ability to affect outcomes through the way in which it makes grantsrecall that seventy-five percent of the NIOSH budget for new research is
devoted to extramural research 362-and
by broadly disseminating
research through OSH networks and practice communities, including
ongoing efforts related to NORA.
Below, subsection a will describe the way in which NIOSH's
strategic management system utilizes two of the three Sturm factors to
advance the agency's goals of making its research and programming
transparent, relevant, and outcome oriented. After that, subsection (b)
will assess one particular NIOSH program, the Personal Protective
Technology (PPT) program in light of Sturm's factors. Ultimately, as
will be described, NIOSH scores well in terms of reciprocity and peer
review, and leveraging networks and practice communities. NIOSH's
efforts might be improved, however, by a greater emphasis on capacitybuilding; in other words, in order to best ensure its research will have
actual real world impact, NIOSH needs more programming promoting
work with those who will put into practice the changes NIOSH research
recommends.
a. Assessing NIOSH's StrategicManagement System
The new governance principles identified by Sturm as contributing to
the ADVANCE program's success apply a bit differently to NIOSH's
strategic management system. This is because there are important
distinctions between the NSF's faculty diversity program and the
scientific management efforts undertaken by NIOSH.
Through creative use of NSF's grant-making authority, the
ADVANCE program seeks to catalyze specific changes in the
organizational structure of its grantees.363 In order to effectuate faculty
diversity gains, NSF must create a strong relationship with the
universities that participate in the program. This relationship enables
NSF to assist its grantees in altering the organizational routines that
stymie diversification. The ADVANCE program is thus an effort focused
on achieving one particular goal-faculty diversification-in a concrete
fashion at specific universities. Lessons from those efforts are then
disseminated to other universities as best practices.

362. See id. at 207.
363. See supra Part I.B.2.
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NIOSH, in contrast, uses its grant making authority in the service of
far broader goals. More specifically, the Institute has created a strategic
management super-structure that guides and influences grant-making but
364
ultimately requires less direct intervention with individual grantees.
Additionally, the ultimate outcomes NIOSH seeks-a reduction of
particular injuries, illnesses, and fatalities-are aimed not at its grantees
but at workplaces that can benefit from its grantees' research.
Nonetheless, Sturm has identified new governance techniques that
enable non-regulatory agencies to affect change even though they lack
traditional enforcement powers.365 It thus makes sense to see whether and
in what respect these techniques are utilized by NIOSH. In the final
analysis, applying Sturm's factors to NIOSH's efforts reveals how those
efforts effectuate sought after change and where they may fall short.
Aspects of NIOSH's strategic management system utilize the first
Sturm factor, reciprocity and peer review,

366

to incentivize OSH research

that is NORA-relevant and produces measurable outcomes. In terms of
reciprocity, to ensure the highest caliber scientific proposals receive
NIOSH funding, the Institute decided in 2005 to apply to its own internal
research a competitive grant process similar to the one used for
extramural NIOSH research.3 67 The idea is to create a level playing field
for scientists working on similar research inside and outside the
Institute. 368 Thus, all scientists whose work is NIOSH-funded share
similar responsibilities for ensuring research of the highest scientific
369
caliber contributes to a NORA priority area and to the r2p initiative.
Additionally, the CDC's Policy on Releasing and Sharing Data ensures
timely release
and sharing of data by extramural and intramural NIOSH
370
researchers.
For strategic management purposes, peer review related to grantee
work takes place at the program level. Recall that National Academies'
expert reviews of the research corpus in eight program areas were
completed during the Bush administration. 37' Each program's research
corpus, made up of extramural and intramural research, was assessed in
364. See supra Part I1.B.2.
365. See Sturm, supra note 214.

366. Seeid. at 314.
367. Howard, supra note 104, at 210.
368. Id.
369. See, e.g., Dep't of Health and Human Services, NIOSH Exploratory and/or
Developmental Grant Program R21, available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pafiles/PAR-09-139.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).

370. See, e.g., CDC/ATSDR, Policy on Releasing and Sharing Data, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/foia/policies/sharing.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
371. See supra notes 358-61 and accompanying text.
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terms of relevance to NORA and overall impact. 372 Program strategic
plans were thereafter amended to incorporate National Academies'
recommendations.3 73 The expert review process thus provides incentives
to grantees desiring continued NIOSH funding to produce research
contributing to a program's overall performance, in terms of relevance
and outcome, and to align their future research proposals with that
program's evolving strategic plan.
NIOSH also uses its strategic management process to leverage its
relationships through professional networks and practice communities,
Sturm's third factor. 374 NIOSH uses these relationships to disseminate
relevant research that can ultimately affect OSH outcomes and to identify
gaps in research that should be filled. 375 Certainly, the Institute's ongoing
participation in OSH consensus standard organizations, OSH symposia
and scientific meetings, and the like represent opportunities for the
diffusion of NIOSH's research-driven innovations. Indeed, this is the
thrust of the r2p initiative-to376
make opinion leaders aware of results that
organizations.
for
utility
have
Here the ongoing role of NORA is also instructive. From an initial
articulation of national research priorities, NORA has grown into a
comprehensive collaborative strategy to stimulate innovative research.377
NORA's government-stakeholder partnership approach brings Institute
personnel into regular contact with stakeholders from industry, workers'
organizations, universities, OSH professional societies, and staff from
other relevant government agencies. Eight sector councils, which
correspond to eight key industrial sectors of the U.S. economy, develop
and maintain research agendas that are sector specific. 378 A cross-sector
council made up of industrial sector council leaders provides a forum for
coordination and collaboration. 379 Through NORA, NIOSH disseminates
current research and simultaneously updates plans to produce new
findings that are relevant and produce actual outcomes.

372.
373.
374.
375.

Id.
Id.
See Sturm, supra note 214, at 321.
See id.

376. Howard, Informing Public Health Policy and Practice: The
Management of Research Processesand Organizations, at 209.

Strategic

377. See NORA Homepage, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/NORA/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
378. See NORA Councils, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/NORA/councils/
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
Cross-Sector
Council available at http://www.cdc.gov379. See NORA
/niosh/NORA/councils/cross/default.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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Having identified in NIOSH's strategic management system
elements of reciprocity and peer review, and leveraging networks and
practice communities, one is left to ponder Sturm's second factor,
capacity building.3 8 ° Of the three, this factor is most difficult to discern in
NIOSH's strategic management system. It might be argued that NIOSH
program capacity building takes place by integrating National
Academies' recommendations into the programs' strategic plans.38 ' Yet
it is not clear that this is the kind of capacity building that most directly
helps workers.
Capacity building is indeed mentioned in NIOSH planning
documents. For example, the Institute's 2010-2015 Strategic Plan
references capacity building among NIOSH's strategic goals.38 2 Strategic
goal number two is to "[p]romote safe and healthy workplaces through
interventions, recommendations, and capacity building." 383 A bullet point
under that goal pledges to "[b]uild capacity to address traditional and
emerging hazards." 384 One assumes the strategic goal is aimed at directly
increasing the ability of organizations to create safe and healthy working
environments.
Of course, it is one thing to express such sentiments in a strategic
plan and quite another to operationalize them in practice. To see whether
a particular NIOSH program was able to promote capacity building,
subsection b below will describe the Institute's Personal Protective
Technology Program, which was independently and favorably evaluated
by the National Academies. 385 This program is susceptible to assessment
using all three Sturm factors and its review may point the way to
enhancing NIOSH's capacity-building capabilities. NIOSH's PPT
Program also provides another stark contrast with OSHA's recent record.
Many critics of OSHA argue that the only significant OSH rule
promulgated by the agency during the Bush years was a final rule on
workplace personal protective equipment. 386 First proposed in 1997
380. See Sturm, supra note 214, at 316.
381. See supra notes 358-61.
382. NIOSH Strategic Plan Outline 2010-2015, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/strategic/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. COMM. TO REVIEW THE NIOSH PERS. PROTECTIVE TECH. PROGRAM, NAT'L ACAD.
OF SCIENCES, FREE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM AT NIOSH 3 (2008) [hereinafter NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].

386. Another significant rule, albeit one judicially challenged by organized labor and
industry representatives, was OSHA's final rule for exposure to hexavalent chromium,
which was published in 2006. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavelent Chromiom, 71
Fed. Reg. 10,100 (Feb. 28, 2006) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1026). On February 23,
2009, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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under the Clinton administration, after years of inexcusable delay, a
lawsuit filed by organized labor against the DOL prompted the Bush
administration's OSHA to publish the final PPE rule in 2007. 387
b. NIOSH's PPTProgram
As mentioned above, notable programming at NIOSH during the
Bush administration included instituting rigorous, independent review of
NIOSH programs by the National Academies of Science. 388 The National
Academies' review of one particular NIOSH program, the Personal
Protective Technology Program, presents an interesting case study of
NIOSH's effectiveness during the years 2001-2007.389 Applying to the
PPT Program the three factors Susan Sturm deemed key to the success of
NSF's ADVANCE program reveals how NIOSH, during this period, was
able to adhere to its mission and catalyze positive OSH outcomes in PPT
despite a lack of traditional regulatory power. Of the three factorsreciprocity and peer review; capacity building; and leveraging networks
and practice communities 390 -the PPT program rates strongest on the
last. Yet aspects of the other two are evident and point to areas where
NIOSH's efforts might improve in the future.
NIOSH defines PPT as "specialized clothing or equipment worn by
individuals for protection against health and safety hazards, as well as the
technical methods, processes, techniques, tools, and materials that
support their developments, evaluation, and use." 391 The mission of the
PPT Program is to prevent occupational "injury, illness and death by
advancing the state of knowledge and application of PPT."'3 92 To that
end, the program is responsible for three significant tasks: (1) certifying
respirators as mandated by federal regulations; (2) conducting research

upheld almost all aspects of the rule except for requesting on remand that OSHA provide
a more comprehensive explanation for its employee exposure notification requirements.
See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. U.S. Dep 't of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 191 (3d
Cir. 2009).
387. See supranote 260.
388. See NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 3.
389. See id.
390. See Sturm, supra note 214, at 314.
391. NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 3.
392. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, EVIDENCE FOR THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES' REVIEW OF THE NIOSH PERSONAL PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM
Preface
1 (2007) available at http://www.cdc.gov/nioshnas/ppt-

/pdfs/pptevpkg_090707_finalR.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter EVIDENCE
FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW].
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on reducing worker exposure to respiratory, dermal, and injury hazards;
and (3) participation in standard setting and policy making.393
The first task is an anchor of the program since employers subject to
the OSH Act or the Mine Safety and Health Act, whose workplaces
expose employees to hazardous respiratory conditions, are legally
required to provide their workers with NIOSH-certified respirators.394
NIOSH has also been quite active regarding the third task. 395 Work on all
three tasks, however, is constrained by budget limitations, and such
constraints, along with a central programmatic focus on respirators,
inhibit efforts to address other forms of PPT.396
To ensure proper program functioning and identify areas for
improvement, in 2004, NIOSH requested that the Institute of Medicine
(10M) and the National Research Council (NRC) form a committee of
experts to evaluate the PPT program's relevance and impact.3 97 That
review was completed in 2008. Peer review, the second part of Sturm's
first factor, is thus relevant to the overall efficacy of the program and its
perception by its stakeholders and partners. By subjecting the PPT
Program to outside review, NIOSH demonstrates to its stakeholders and
partners the seriousness of its mission, its willingness to have its own
work evaluated by the highest scientific standards, and its desire for
programmatic transparency. Similarly, the scientific validity of PPT
Program outputs is bolstered by publication of its scientific findings in
peer-reviewed journals. Publishing its research in highly regarded
scientific journals places NIOSH scientists within the broader
community of OSH researchers and reinforces the agency's reputation as
a premiere OSH research institution. In the period from 2001 through
2007, the PPT Program produced for publication eighty-two peerreviewed manuscripts on dermal and inhalation hazards.398
Unlike NSF's ADVANCE program, however, which provides for
evaluation and review of its grantees' progress in diversifying their
science and engineering faculties, the PPT Program does not
systematically evaluate end users of its products. Thus, the National
Academies' review of the PPT Program noted that field testing
respirators would improve program effectiveness 399 and suggested
research be undertaken to examine barriers to and facilitators of the use
393. See NAS EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 5.
394. Id. at 5-6.
395. Id. at 6.
396. Id. at 5-6.
397. See id. at 3. Both the IOM and the NRC are part of the National Academies of
Science. Id. at 20.
398. See EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-37.
399. NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 6.
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of PPT by end users. 400 In other words, the National Academies indicated
that the PPT Program would benefit from reciprocity in the peer
evaluation process; NIOSH should subject itself to review and
simultaneously provide for review of how PPT is being used by its
partners and stakeholders on the ground. While some of the latter is
being done in the area of emergency responders and firefighters, the
review report recommended PPT usability research be undertaken for
workers employed in other occupations throughout the economy.401
As compared to peer review, the PPT's efforts in capacity building,
Sturm's second factor, are somewhat less impressive. Here NIOSH's r2p
Program, adopted during the Bush administration, is relevant to the work
of the PPT Program. As described by the PPT Program:
Research to Practice (r2p) is a NIOSH initiative focused on the
transfer and translation of research findings, technologies, and
information into highly effective prevention practices and
products that are adopted in the workplace. The goal of r2p is to
reduce illness and injury by increasing workplace use of
effective NIOSH and NIOSH-funded research findings. To
achieve this, the PPT Program continues to work with our
partners to focus research on ways to develop effective products,
translate research findings into practice, target dissemination
efforts, and evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of these
efforts in improving worker health and safety.40 2
Rather than transfer the research to practice by directly working with
employers and workers to build their capacity, however, the PPT
Program generally relies on outreach through less direct means,
including participating in standards development organizations (SDO),
remaining active in the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability, and participating in conferences, workshops,
professional meetings, and trade shows.40 3 While these activities enable
PPT Program personnel to interact with industry "leaders who are likely
to become early adopters of program research,"'4 4 clearly the PPT

400. Id. at 16.
401. Id.
402. EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-35.

403. Id.
404. Id.
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Program would have more control over outcomes by working directly
with end users.4 ° 5

One area where the PPT Program exhibits capacity building activity
is in its response to the over one hundred assistance and information
requests received annually by the program.4 °6 Routine contacts
frequently involve requests for technical training by user groups such as
labor unions.40 7 Through "Train the Trainer" programs, the PPT Program
helps OSH training professionals update their skills to better meet
emerging safety and health challenges.40 8
Emergency requests involve the PPT Program in much greater
capacity building activity. During the National Academies' report review
period, the PPT Program responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the anthrax scare that followed soon thereafter, the 2003 Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, and hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in 2005.409 Extensive capacity building, for example, is evidenced in the
program's swift response to a request for help from the New York City
Department of Health in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade
410
Center. PPT Program efforts, which began just hours after the attack,
included identifying potential hazards, helping select proper protective
equipment for workers, developing procedures for cleaning and
sanitizing equipment on site to allow for reuse, and developing
"guidelines to help supervisors integrate worker safety and health into
site operations.",41 These efforts have increased the capacity of New
York City's emergency first responders to meet future natural and
manmade disasters.
The PPT Program's strongest showing on the Sturm factors,
however, is in leveraging professional networks and communities of
practice, a technique used effectively by the program in standard-setting
activities. Helping develop mandatory standards, which are federally
required standards developed by enforcement agencies via rulemaking,
405. The NIOSH evidentiary report prepared in advance of the National Academies'
review evinces some concern about NIOSH's lack of control over how research is
transferred and what the outcomes of transfer may be. Id. at 1-13. The evidentiary report
attributes the lack of control to its dependent but necessary partnerships with employers,
labor, industry groups, regulatory bodies, and PPT manufacturers. Id. Attempting to
influence the actions of their partners is considered an intermediate output of the PPT
program. Id. at 1-14.
406. EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-38.

407. Id.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id.
Id.at 2-39.
See id.
Id.
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and consensus standards, which are created by national and international
standards development organizations, is an element of the PPT
Program. 1 2 Recall that the program's
third task is to participate in
4 13
standard setting and policy making.
Regrettably, the adoption of mandatory standards encompassing the
latest technologies and research is hampered by the lengthy and often
contentious notice and comment rulemaking process.414 One important
project for the PPT Program, for example, is assisting in updating
regulations for mine self-rescue respirators, an essential piece of
equipment for miners trapped in mine collapses.4 15 Yet the National
Academies' review noted in 2008 that rule making was only in its initial
stages and needed to be expedited.416
Participation in the development of consensus standards, however,
enables the PPT Program to increase its influence and spread its research
findings broadly. Consensus standards are developed by SDO
committees comprised of representatives of PPT users, labor, industry,
government, academia, and the professional OSH community. 417 PPT
program personnel participate in the activities of a number of SDOs,
including those conducted by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the American Society for Testing and Materials
International (ASTM), the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 4 18 The
National Academies' review found the PPT Program's participation in
setting consensus standards and testing methods has been "productive,"
especially in the setting of "standards designed to reduce hazardous
dermal exposure. ' '419 Another positive outcome noted in the review was
the PPT program's contributions through the consensus standard-making
process 0 to "test methods and performance standards for protective
gear.

42

Overall, the National Academies' review of the PPT Program was
favorable, as noted in the report's Executive Summary:
[T]he PPT Program has made meaningful contributions to
improving worker health and safety. Using a five-point scoring
412. EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-5.

413.
414.
415.
416.

See NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 5.
See EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-6.
See NAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 385, at 6.
Id.

417. See EVIDENCE FOR THE PPT PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 392, at 2-5.

418. Id. at 2-6.
419. NAS EXECUTIVE
420. Id.

SUMMARY,

supra note 385, at 6.
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scale (where 5 is the highest), the committee assigned the
NIOSH PPT Program a score of 4 for relevance. This score
reflects the judgment that the PPT Program is working in priority
areas and is engaged in transferring its research to improved
products and processes. The committee also assigned the PPT
Program a score of 4 for impact, indicating that the program has
made probable contributions to end outcomes (improvements in
in addition to well-accepted
worker health or safety)
42 1
intermediate outcomes.

In short, the review of the PPT Program is evidence that NIOSH
positively influenced OSH outcomes while adhering to and expanding its
mission during the Bush administration. While the National Academies'
review pointed to areas where improvement in the program was
warranted, obtaining such guidance from an independent reviewer is
itself an accomplishment for NIOSH. Under the leadership of John
Howard, the Institute positioned itself for continual improvement and
responsiveness to changing conditions in the years ahead.
Given this record of productivity, it is easy to understand why the
Bush administration's NIOSH was held in much higher esteem than its
sister agency OSHA. The next section examines the effect NIOSH's
enhanced standing had on its ability to survive politically motivated
attacks. In particular, the section addresses the ultimately unsuccessful
effort in 2004 to demote NIOSH within the CDC's organizational
hierarchy. The aforementioned successful intervention on behalf of the
Institute by its stakeholders is an example of the way in which a wellfunctioning non-regulatory agency can sustain itself during a troubled
period of deregulation.
2. NIOSH's Encounters with Politics - Part 2
As noted above, in the mid-1990s, a critical political threat to
NIOSH's existence caused the Institute to rethink its mission and its
research agenda.422 Those efforts, most specifically the process that gave
birth to NORA, greatly elevated NIOSH's standing with its stakeholders.
Ultimately, the reservoir of good will resulting from the agency's
decision to engage with its stakeholders helped NIOSH forestall a less
critical but nonetheless significant political threat in 2004.423 In that year,

421. Id. at 2.

422. See Weiss, supra note 140, at A19.
423. See id.
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CDC Director Julie Gerberding proposed a major reorganization of the
Centers, including the demotion of NIOSH within the CDC hierarchy. n4
Under Gerberding's proposal, NIOSH was to be located in a midlevel CDC coordinating center, the Coordinating Center for
Environmental Health, Injury Prevention, and Occupational Health,425
and its Director would no longer report directly to the Director of the
CDC.426 Some attributed the reorganization effort to the Bush
administration's aim of politicizing science; 427 in other words, by
demoting NIOSH the CDC would gain greater control over the release of
NIOSH's scientific findings. Those findings, they argued, would be
refrained or suppressed if they failed to advance the Bush
administration's political agenda, which was deregulatory and probusiness. 428 Evidence for this view was the involvement of Kent "Oz"
Nelson in the CDC's Futures Initiative, which aimed to streamline the
CDC.4 2 9 Nelson was the former chief of United Parcel Service, which
had battled against the ergonomic standards promulgated by OSHA in
the Clinton administration's waning days.430
Regardless of motive, the plan would have reduced the NIOSH
Director's access, standing and influence within the CDC.4 3 1
Additionally, by lumping NIOSH in with federal scientific programs that
do not study occupational issues, the reorganization would have diluted
the Institute's impact, diminished the resources available to it, and
hampered its ability to market its successes.4 32
Significant opposition to the reorganization by NIOSH stakeholders,
along with written protests from every living former NIOSH director,
eventually scuttled the Institute's demotion.4 33 A former Reagan
424. Id.
425. See David Kotelchuck, Chair'sMessage, Occupational Health and Safety Section
Newsletter, American Public Health Association, Fall 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.apha.org/membergroups/newsletters/sectionnewsletters/occupatfal104/
(last
visited Jan. 19, 2010).
426. See Weiss, supra note 140, at AI9.
427. Id.
428. See id; see also Kathleen Hennessey, Changes at Health Institute Assailed, L.A.
TIMES,

July 24, 2004, at A12.

429. See Weiss, supra note 140, at A19. ("Gerberding, who is realigning NIOSH as
part of her Futures Initiative to streamline the CDC, said in an interview that she intends
to retain and increase NIOSH's impact.").
430. See id. Indeed, in March 2001, Congress passed a resolution of disapproval of
OSHA's ergonomics regulation. President Bush signed the resolution repealing the rules
shortly thereafter. See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA 's
Ergonomics Rulemaking, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 688, 696 (2007).
431. See Weiss, supra note 140, at A 19.
432. See Denny Dobbin, Quo Vadis NIOSH, AOEC NEWS, Summer 2004, at I.
433. See Weiss, supra note 140, at A19.
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administration labor official described opposition to the plan as "the first
issue in the last decade that all the worker safety and health stakeholder
groups agree on. ' '43 4 These interests, so rarely in harmony, stood united
in their demand that the independence of NIOSH and its position within
the CDC be preserved.435 Congress responded with language in the 2005
appropriations legislation directing the CDC to preserve NIOSH's
position within the centers, 436 a result seen as a victory for NIOSH
stakeholders.4 37 Yet it was also validation of NIOSH's approach to
engaging with its stakeholders. By actively involving them in the work of
the Institute, NIOSH not only increased transparency, research relevance,
and measurable research outcomes. The Institute also increased its ability
to withstand political threats during a troubling time of deregulatory
sentiment emanating from the White House.
Similar unity was demonstrated in a final political challenge
involving NIOSH. More specifically, the failure in 2008 of CDC
Director Gerberding to reappoint Dr. Howard to a second six-year term
generated significant controversy.4 38 Dr. Howard had achieved strong
support among business leaders, trade unions, health and safety
professionals, and lawmakers. 439 Some speculated Gerberding's decision

was related to the CDC reorganization. 440 This time, however,
stakeholder support was unable to affect the outcome. Dr. Christine
Branch became Acting Director of NIOSH after Dr. Howard's term as
director ended. 44'
434. Id.
435. See Dobbin, supra note 141, at 1.
436. Id.The language in the Senate report is quite explicit:

[T]he Committee directs the CDC to maintain the status quo with respect to the
direct reporting relationship of the NIOSH director to the CDC director. The
Committee further directs the CDC to: (1) make no changes to NIOSH's
current operating procedures and organizational structure and (2) ensure that no
funds or personnel will be transferred from NIOSH to other components of
CDC by means other than traditional reprogramming of funds.
2005 Senate Appropriations Report.
437. See Sandy Smith, Congress May Bar NIOSH Reorganization,EHS TODAY, Dec.
1, 2004, available at http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs_imp_37313, (last visited Jan. 22,
2010) (quoting Gene Barfield, President of the American Society of Safety Engineers).
438. See A PointlessDeparture,supra note 142; Young, supra note 142.
439. See A PointlessDeparture,supra note 142.
440. Id.
441. Dr. Christine Branch served in that role for approximately one year. See Howard
to Return to NIOSH, Government Affairs Updates, American Society of Safety
Engineers, Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.asse.org/professionalaffairs/govtaffairs/gaupdate/index.php?-issue=2009-09-09 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)
(reproducing e-mail from CDC Director Thomas R. Frieden, inter alia, thanking Dr.
Branch for her service as Acting Director).
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3. NIOSH and the New Economy
This Article began by considering the OSH challenges and mental
and physical effects produced by chronic job insecurity associated with
the new economy. As noted above, public health researchers recommend
conducting research to assess the extent of the problem and identify
strategies to ameliorate it.442 Here, too, NIOSH research has remained on
the leading edge, with the agency exhibiting continuity in its work
despite changes in presidential administration. Moreover, in its work on
this important topic, NIOSH has used collaborative problem solving, a
key new governance technique.
To better grasp how and why OSH may be affected and promulgate a
national research agenda on the subject, NIOSH, in 1996, during the
Clinton administration, created an interdisciplinary research team under
the auspices of NORA. 44 3 The team conferred with stakeholders in
universities, industry, and organized labor as part of the project.4 " Their
efforts concluded in 2002, during the Bush administration, with the
publication of a comprehensive report. 445
Noting that little research has been done on the OSH risks of the
rapidly changing workplace, the report first recommended developing a
comprehensive surveillance system to better track the way in which work
patterns are being transformed." 6 NIOSH's report also identified
significant gaps in existing research on the OSH effects of our changing
economy. 44 7 Developments that may have adverse health effects include:
reengineering production processes, organizational downsizing, flexible
staffing, increasingly long hours of work and increased workload,
telecommuting, and the special risks encountered by vulnerable worker
populations such as women, racial and other minority populations, and
older workers. 448 Finally, the report highlighted gaps in research on
potential interventions that can reverse or moderate the negative OSH
effects of our increasingly turbulent workplaces.449

442. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
443. See STEVEN L. SAUTER, ET AL., THE CHANGING
SAFETY AND
DIRECTIONS

HEALTH

OF

WORKING

PEOPLE:

ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND THE
KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND RESEARCH

iii (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2002-116/
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
444. See id. at vi.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 6-8.
447. Id. at 9-18.
448. Id.
449. SAUTER, ET AL., supra note 443, at 19-23.
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Since the publication of the report, NIOSH has engaged in research
and further publication aimed at filling the research gaps described
above. For example, a 2004 report provides a summary of fifty-two
studies examining the connection between long working hours, OSH,
and work performance.450 Additionally, a 2008 article by NIOSH
researchers lays out what is known about the OSH implications of
nontraditional employment relationships, including temporary employees
employed by agencies, independent contractors, and part-time
employees.4 51
Admittedly, the new economy research represents only a small part
of the Institute's research corpus. Nonetheless, NIOSH's new economy
research demonstrates institutional engagement with the changing nature
of the economy and work. The Institute's efforts also illustrate the degree
to which, during the Bush administration, the agency was able to pursue
its mission and create knowledge that may eventually be utilized by its
regulatory counterparts.
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM TROUBLED TIMES

The story, during the Bush administration, of the disparate
performance of sister agencies OSHA and NIOSH offers several lessons.
First, it reminds scholars of administrative law and process that in
theorizing about how agencies do or should work, one must be mindful
that they may function quite differently depending on the political
environment of the time. Given this, it may be that the creation of a
largely soft-law public structure like NIOSH serves an important role in
times of deregulation. Less vulnerable to change with the political winds,
such public intermediaries may be able to more effectively carry out their
missions and produce real world results than their regulatory
counterparts.
Second, the saga of OSHA and NIOSH during the Bush presidency
may prompt scholars of OSH law and practice to rethink the common
assumption that the separation of the two agencies in different executive
departments has hindered OSH outcomes on the ground. In fact, it
appears likely that their separation was a crucial factor in NIOSH's good
performance record during the last presidential administration. Had
NIOSH been housed within the DOL, for example, its efforts would have
450. CLAIRE C. CARUSO, ET AL., OVERTIME AND EXTENDED WORK SHIFTS: RECENT
FINDINGS ON ILLNESSES, INJURIES, AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS iv (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2004-143/pdfs/2004-143.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
451. Kristin J. Cummings & Kathleen Kreiss, Contingent Workers and Contingent
Health: Risks of a Modern Economy, 299 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 448 (2008).
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been much more vulnerable to attack. Recalling the popcorn lung case
study, it is highly unlikely that OSHA chief John Henshaw, who presided
over OSHA's initial ineffective response to the problem, or Edwin
Foulke, ' who
deemed the link between diacetyl and the disease
"1murky, A52 would have sat idly by while NIOSH made vigorous efforts
to get its research into the hands of those most affected by the additive.
More likely, in this author's opinion, is that OSHA political appointees
would have advised Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao to suppress the
research or call it into doubt.
Finally, considering the disparate experiences of OSHA and NIOSH
during the Bush administration can inform new governance scholars.
While under ideal conditions, new governance programming, such as the
Clinton administration's ill-fated Cooperative Compliance Program, the
OSHA program aimed at employers with poor safety records, melds
together the use of carrots and sticks, such programs themselves are
subject to sharp and effective political attack. Moreover, during times of
deregulation, the regulatory agencies in which such innovative programs
are housed may well be inclined to render the programming cosmetic
rather than substantive. Although the impact of soft-law public
intermediaries may be less direct than hard-law regulation during the best
of times, during troubled times, agencies like NIOSH may prove much
more adept at pursuing their public missions.
Now that the regulatory tide has apparently turned, OSHA and
NIOSH should work to create meaningful yet impermanent links so that
the research of the latter informs the work of the former. This, one would
imagine, may happen as a matter of course since flexible structures for
exchange already exist. A change of regulatory mindset on OSHA's
part-from indifference to NIOSH findings to engagement with themis all that is necessary. In addition to regular meetings of the OSHANIOSH Issues Exchange Group,453 greater participation by OSHA in
NORA activities is a way to catalyze robust agency interchange. There is
certainly precedent for such cooperation. During the Bush
administration, for example, NIOSH and OSHA closely collaborated on
pandemic flu preparedness, resulting in the creation of a government

452. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
453. The OSHA-NIOSH Issues Exchange Group is an inter-agency group designed to
encourage interaction between the two agencies on standard setting and other
collaborative efforts. See Detailed Information on the CDC: Occupational Safety and
Health Assessment, 3.5, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/i 0002160.2004.html#questions (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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website for flu preparedness and interim guidance on the use of masks
and respirators in health care settings.45 4
Indeed we may be poised for an unprecedented period of
collaboration between the two agencies. As noted above, Dr. David
Michaels is the Obama administration's new Assistant Secretary for
Labor at OSHA. 455 Dr. Michaels, who inter alia published articles on the
popcorn lung debacle,456 was before his confirmation Research Professor
in the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health at George
is the use
Washington University. 4 5' A particular focus of his research
458
and potential manipulation of science in public policy.
Meanwhile, DHHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced on
September 3, 2009, the reappointment of Dr. John Howard to head
NIOSH.459 Secretary Sebelius also appointed Dr. Howard to serve as
DHHS Coordinator for World Trade Center Programs. 6 ° Since Dr.
Howard's appointment does not require Senate confirmation, his posting
took effect immediately.4 6'
Interchange and engagement between Drs. Howard and Michaels and
their respective agencies seems almost inevitable. Yet ironically, the
closer the two agencies work, the greater the chance that NIOSH will be
rendered vulnerable because it, like OSHA, will be seen as part of a
regulatory system attempting to impose costs on industry. One can only
hope that by scrupulously maintaining its independence and continuing
its innovative scientific management, NIOSH can maintain its reputation
with its stakeholders, including those from the business community,
while simultaneously translating its research findings, where appropriate,
into traditional and responsive regulatory efforts by OSHA.

454. See MINUTES FROM THE NOVEMBER 28, 2005 MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

Nov. 28, 2006, availableat http://www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nagenda06l128A.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
455. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 280, 290.
457. See George Washington University Faculty Profile of David Michaels, at
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/faculty/michaelsdavid.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
458. See DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT Is TIIEIR PRODUCT: How INDUSTRY'S ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008).
459. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Sebelius
Announces New Director of CDC's National Institute, (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090903d.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
460. Id.
461. Id.

